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ABSTRACT 
 The American Civil War and the Italian Unification occurred simultaneously, and the 
major parties involved – the American government, the Confederacy, the Italian state, and the 
still-independent Papal States – interacted with each other on numerous occasions. The 
revolutionaries of the Risorgimento served as promising recruits for the Union’s armies, 
especially Garibaldi himself, although only Italians already in America actually fought. Italy 
would receive ironclad warships from the wartime United States. Those actions, however, 
alienated the Papal States from the North, presenting the Confederacy a diplomatic opportunity. 
The positive position of Catholicism in the South permitted the Confederacy to act and the 
possibility of diplomatic recognition by Catholic countries in Europe, particularly France, 
provided the Confederacy with the motivation to reach out to the Vatican. While the 
Confederacy did not receive recognition, it did receive a letter from Pope Pius IX expressing his 
sympathies, which the Confederacy at times portrayed as a formal recognition. Armed with the 
argument that the Pope had recognized its sovereignty, the Confederacy tried to dissuade 
Catholics from enlisting in the Union military. Any successes, however, were too minor to be 
effective. During the war, a bitter debate developed in the press about the letter’s meaning, a 
debate that extended into the postwar period largely as a weapon against Catholicism, especially 
when coupled with the Pope’s postwar support for former Confederates. The distortion of the 
letter as a sign of recognition lived on in anti-Catholic rhetoric, sometimes supported even by 
members of the U.S. government. The argument, however, was later refuted by Catholic prelates 
and historians. 
“The Pope and the Presidents” contributes to a growing scholarship on the 
internationalization of the Civil War by revealing the complex relationships between all the 
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parties in the Civil War and the Italian Unification. Taking the analysis a step further, it looks at 
these relationships in ways that many previous historians, ignoring the interactions of 
multilateral diplomacy, overlooked. It does so bringing together secondary research from 
scholars who examined the histories separately and using a wealth of newspaper articles and 
other documents now accessible though digitalization.
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CHAPTER 1 
THE ITALIAN UNIFICATION AND AMERICA’S REACTION (1815-1865) 
The history of the American Civil War has long been confined to narratives restricted to 
America’s shores. When historians began introducing the international context of the war, those 
narratives too were restricted as histories of bilateral diplomacy, limited to the actions of the 
diplomats of only the parties of the Civil War and one additional nation. Diplomacy, however, 
can never be fully understood when only the two nations in question are considered. Rather, 
popular movements and conflicts exist with utter disregard for political borders; understanding 
transnational movements and multinational relationships are essential to understanding any 
diplomacy. Don H. Doyle took this into account in his recent book, The Cause of All Nations: An 
International History of the American Civil War.1 Doyle argues that the international, 
particularly European, debate between liberal republicanism and conservative despotism shaped 
the international reaction to and interaction with the American Civil War. At that time, liberalism 
could be seen as a transnational movement in Europe whose nations saw their own struggles in 
the conflict in America. The area where this was most poignant was in Italy in the midst of its 
own war of unification centered on the struggle between liberalism and despotism. The liberal 
Italian revolutionaries saw their own ideological conflict reflected in the Civil War and reached 
out to the Union that had effectively presented themselves as the liberal party in the Civil War. 
                                                 
1 Don H. Doyle, The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American 
Civil War (New York: Basic Books, 2015). Doyle’s account of the diplomacy between the 
Confederacy and the Papacy differs in some respects from that developed here. Most notably, the 
topic of slavery is presented as Pope Pius’s chief motivation for not recognizing the 
Confederacy; this thesis argues that that decision was made primarily to keep available the 
option of mediating the Civil War as a means of gaining international stature to defend against 
the Italian Unification. Since The Cause of All Nations appeared as this thesis was completed, 
Doyle’s findings and interpretations have not been included or addressed. 
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“The Pope and the Presidents” looks at transnational liberalism from the opposite 
direction, focusing rather on the chief anti-liberal party in the Italian Unification, the Papacy, and 
its interaction with the Civil War. To understand the wartime actions of Pope Pius IX, 
particularly his famous sympathetic letter to Jefferson Davis, the Pontiff cannot be looked at in 
isolation. While a narrow history could see the Pope as choosing sides in the Civil War, it was 
the Pope’s position in the context of the Italian Unification and his overriding desire to survive 
that movement that drove his behavior. To understand why Pius IX acted the way he did, we 
must look at the context of the Italian Unification, how it affected the Pope’s priorities and how 
America’s association with that movement drove the Pope away from the Union. America 
clearly chose to support the Kingdom of Italy, acting largely with disregard for how that support 
would negatively affect relations with the Papal States. Throughout the war, America sought to 
recruit Italians and provided them with several ironclad warships. The Confederacy’s outreach to 
the Papacy must be examined to show how and why they chose to try to gain Pope Pius’s 
support. Although many historians have looked at the Papal-Confederate relationship exclusively 
bilaterally, the Confederacy did not limit its worldview. Rather, the Confederates saw the Papal 
relationship as key to taking advantage of another transnational ideology, Catholicism, by using 
Papal support to influence Catholic governments and peoples beyond the Italian Peninsula. This 
same argument also had domestic implications, making Papal diplomacy not merely a foreign 
affairs issue in America but a cultural and social issue about Catholicism on the home front. The 
earliest memories of the Papal-Confederate relationship after the Civil War were largely 
distorted to become a tool for use against American Catholicism until finally fading from popular 
memory. 
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The Italian Unification profoundly affected how the states on the Italian Peninsula 
conducted their diplomacy. No discussion of Civil War diplomacy regarding any of the parties of 
the Italian Unification could be complete without fully examining that event and how America 
reacted to it. The most fundamental aspect making interaction unavoidable between the Italian 
Unification and the American Civil War was their contemporaneousness. During the autumn of 
1860, crowds gathered in the United States and on the Italian Peninsula to vote. These two 
elections altered the course of history. On Sunday, October 21, residents of the southern regions 
of the Italian Peninsula and the island of Sicily voted overwhelmingly to become a part of “Italy 
one and indivisible, with Victor Emanuel II and his legitimate descendants as constitutional 
monarch.”2 Two weeks and two days later, voters in the United States elected their first 
Republican president, Abraham Lincoln. Happening just weeks apart, both elections radically 
affected the course of the subsequent decade. The contemporaneous nature of Italian Unification 
and the American Civil War significantly affected relations between the two war-torn regions. 
Those who sought to maintain a united America maintained a close relationship with those who 
sought to unite Italy. Likewise, those who dissented from national unity, the Confederacy and the 
Papal States in particular, also sought close relationships. 
The elections on the Italian Peninsula in 1860, formally plebiscites or national referenda, 
marked the achievement of a major goal of the centuries-old political movement known as the 
                                                 
2 On the island of Sicily, Sicilians voted 432,053 to 667 in favor of a united Italy; in the 
former Kingdom of Naples, the peninsular region of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 
Neapolitans voted 1,302,064 to 10,312 in favor of a united Italy. It has been argued these votes 
are more a reflection of the local support for Giuseppe Garibaldi who had recently conquered the 
region and opposition to the former autocratic Bourbon monarchy than actual support for 
unification. Martin Clark, The Italian Risorgimento (New York: Pearson Education Limited, 
2009), 82-83. 
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Risorgimento,3 which sought a unified Italian Peninsula. Since the fall of the Roman Empire 
fourteen centuries before, foreign intrusions, deep regionalist sentiments, and powerful dynasties 
on the Italian Peninsula had precluded a unified state. The end of the eighteenth century, though, 
laid the foundation for change that would dramatically alter the Italian political landscape. The 
commercialization of agriculture undermined the powers of the local nobility and the Catholic 
Church which held feudal control over the economies of the peninsula. The rural poor became 
increasingly marginalized as a rapid increase in population further aggravated the political 
situation in the nineteenth century. No event, however, altered the course of the Italian 
Peninsula’s sociopolitical structure more than French rule during the French Revolutionary and 
Napoleonic Wars, resulting in bureaucratic centralization. Opposed by the established elites, the 
Napoleonic government opened new paths for political mobility to larger populations. The fall of 
Napoleon led to the restoration of many of the former powers that existed before the French 
conquest, as well as the extension of Austrian authority in the northern regions of Venetia and 
Lombardy. 4 
At the end of the Napoleonic period in the early nineteenth century, Italy was divided into 
distinct regions and numerous governments. The northeast, including Venice and Milan, was 
ruled by the Austrian Empire and the northwest by the Savoy family, who ruled the Piedmont 
and Liguria regions as well as the island of Sardinia from their Piedmontese capital of Turin. 
                                                 
3 Risorgimento literally translates from Italian as “resurgence.” It was selected by pro-
unification authors to be the title of the Italian Unification movement. It was chosen as a literary 
device to imply the unification was a “resurgence” to restore a glorified past of a free and united 
Italy acting against foreign and domestic oppression. Lucy Riall, The Italian Risorgimento: 
State, Society, and National Unification (New York: Routledge, 1994), 1-2. 
4 Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, 12. 
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From 1849 until his death in 1878, the Savoyard monarch was King Victor Emmanuel II. South 
of these regions were a series of ducal city-states, such as Modena and Parma. To their southwest 
was the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Central Italy was the secular domain of the Roman Papacy, 
which also governed the Roman Catholic Church, the dominant religious institution both on the 
peninsula and throughout many countries in the world. Southern Italy and the island of Sicily 
were controlled by one man, the King of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, a member of a foreign 
dynasty, the House of Bourbon. 5 For a visualization of the state of affairs on the Italian 
Peninsula beginning in 1815, see Figure 1. 
It was in this post-Napoleonic climate that tensions over how the peninsula was 
governed, particularly its lack of national unity, resulted in action. Italian autocrats restored with 
Napoleon’s collapse began to clash more frequently with increasingly liberal populaces. The 
early 1820s saw failed uprisings in the north and the south of the peninsula; in 1831, liberals 
briefly drove the Papacy from the Papal Legations, the Pontiff’s northernmost territories of 
Umbria, the Marches, and Romagna. In 1848 and 1849 revolutions broke out throughout Italy, 
including one that would drive the Pope from Rome itself and alter the nature of his Pontificate. 
French and Austria military forces put down all of these insurrections.6 
The 1848-1849 revolution in Rome, in particular, despite its ultimate failure, had an 
important impact on the course of Italian Unification and, as a result of America’s reaction to the 
revolt, affected the relationship between the United States and the Papal States. The most notable  
                                                 
5 Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, xv. 
6 Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, 11-13. 
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Figure 1: Map of the Unification of Italy, 1815-18707 
                                                 
7 This is a map of the Italian Peninsula from the restoration of post-Napoleonic states to 
the completion of the Risorgimento in 1870. The dates listed are the years in which the particular 
region or country became a part of the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont (if annexed prior to 
March 1861) or the Kingdom of Italy (if annexed after March 1861). Fig. 1, William Shepherd, 
Map of the Unification of Italy, 1815-1870, 1911. Map. “File:Italy unification 1815 1870.jpg,” 
Wikipedia, April 8, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/.  
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impact of the Roman Republic, the government declared by the revolutionaries who seized 
Rome, was the change it caused in the political positions of the Papal States’ longest-reigning 
leader, Pope Pius IX. In 1846, the Cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church had met at the 
Quirinale Palace in Rome to select a new Pope following the death of Pope Gregory XVI. Pope 
Gregory had ruled the Papal States autocratically, resisting all calls for liberalization and 
democratization for his secular government. 8 Feeling a need to change the manner in which the 
Papacy handled its secular lands, the College of Cardinals elected the liberal Cardinal Giovanni 
Maria Mastai-Ferretti as Roman Pontiff. On June 16, 1846, he received the necessary two-thirds 
vote to become the next Pope, taking the name Pius IX (see Figure 2).9 Born in the Marches to a 
noble though not wealthy family, Cardinal Mastai opposed the repressive nature of his 
predecessor’s Pontificate.10 Prior to his own Pontificate, the future Pope openly contemplated 
enacting limited political reforms noting, “I do not understand the quarrelsome attitude of our 
government which mortifies with persecution the youth which inspires our generation.” He 
believed, “it would be so easy to make them [the young] happy and inspire their confidence and 
love.”11 
                                                 
8 The desire for a liberal pontificate was strong but not universal. A popular tradition 
holds that Cardinal Karl Guysruck of Austrian-controlled Milan was entrusted by the Austrian 
Chancellor, Klemens von Metternich, with a veto of the candidacy of Cardinal Mastai. Frank J. 
Coppa, Pope Pius IX: Crusader in a Secular Age (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1979), 42; E. E. 
Y. Hales, Pio Nono: A Study in European Politics and Religion in the Nineteenth Century (New 
York: P. J. Kenedy & Sons, 1954). 
9 Cardinal Mastai chose the name Pius IX in order to commemorate Pius VII, who 
reigned from 1800 to 1823. Both men had served as the Bishop of Imola in Romagna; as bishop, 
Pius VII had supported and made possible Mastai’s vocation to the priesthood. Coppa, Pius IX, 
41. 
10 Coppa, Pope Pius IX, 19-20. 
11 Coppa, Pope Pius IX, 39. 
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Figure 2: Pope Pius IX12 
Pius IX, as Pope, acted upon these feelings. He instituted the Consulta di Stato, a 
representative body that would advise the Papal government. He took action against Austrian 
authority in Italy, popularizing himself as a liberal. His secular subjects, however, struggled to 
feel the effects of his reforms. His policy on freedom of the press mirrored that of his autocratic 
predecessor, Gregory XVI. Despite opening all but one position, the Secretary of State, to 
laymen, not a single position was actually filled by a non-clergyman. Efforts for liberalization 
occurred but only slowly. As revolutionary activity became widespread in the beginning of 1848, 
                                                 
12 Fig. 2, Pope Pius IX, 1878. Photograph. “File:Pius ix.jpg,” Wikipedia, April 8, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/. 
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three laymen were appointed as ministers to appease those demanding reforms; more laymen 
would later achieve positions as well. In an unprecedented act, on March 14 of that year, the 
Pontiff promulgated the Statuto Fondamentale, which served as a Roman Constitution. However, 
the changes proved insufficient; more people demanded Italian unification and republicanism. In 
September, Pius IX appointed Pellegrino Rossi to lead the Papal government. Rossi proved an 
effective leader and was trusted by the Pope. Then, everything changed on November 15: Rossi’s 
throat was slashed and he bled to death during an attack by enraged Romans as a republican mob 
began to seize the city. Ministers and Cardinals fled Rome: the protests had turned into a 
revolution. On November 24, the Pope, disguised as an average priest, fled Rome for the fortress 
of Gaeta in the neighboring Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.13 
The fall of Rome in 1848 and the subsequent proclamation of a Roman Republic affected 
Pius IX’s Pontificate as well as its relations with the United States. The proclamation of a 
republic in Rome in the place of a theocracy placed the United States in a difficult diplomatic 
position. The American consul, Nicholas Brown, in charge of the American delegation at the 
time, acted in accord with American ideology. He immediately told the revolutionary 
government that “so deeply rooted in every American heart (is) the love of liberty” that the 
American people “will at once hail with joy the Independence of the Roman Republic long 
before their diplomatic agents can have time in due official form to give expression to the 
generous sentiments of their constituency.”14 Despite Brown’s urging, however, formal 
American recognition never came. The United States government was more practical than 
                                                 
13 Coppa, Pope Pius IX, 55-91. 
14 Leo Francis Stock, “The United States at the Court of Pius IX,” The Catholic 
Historical Review 9, 1 (April 1923): 108. 
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ideological. James Buchanan, the future American President and, at the time, Secretary of State 
in the Polk Administration, stated that the Roman Republic’s “recent origin and the almost 
insuperable difficulties by which it is surrounded, render it extremely doubtful whether it will be 
able to maintain itself.”15 The United States allowed Lewis Cass, Jr., the American Minister who 
arrived on the peninsula during the crisis, to choose which government to present himself to: the 
new Republic or the exiled Papacy. The situation, though, did not remain stable long enough for 
Cass to make his choice. Despite formal recognition never happening, America stood alone in its 
diplomatic wavering; the Papacy did not forget.16 
No nation recognized the Republic, as intervening events prevented even America from 
doing so. The French remained loyal to the Papacy and restored the Papacy to Rome. On July 3, 
1849, the French Army entered Rome; on April 12, 1850, Pius IX entered Rome as a restored 
leader.17 The Roman Republic’s greatest impact, however, was in the reaction of Pius IX 
himself. The day that Rossi died was the last day that anyone could say that Pius was a liberal. 
                                                 
15 Stock, “The United States at the Court of Pius IX,” 108. 
16 Stock, “The United States at the Court of Pius IX,” 110. 
17 At this point in time, the Orleanist July Monarchy of King Louis-Phillipe I had been 
overthrown in the Revolutions of 1848. France was then the French Second Republic led by 
President Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte. In 1852, President Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte would 
declare himself Emperor Napoleon III. John Merriman, A History of Modern Europe: From the 
French Revolution to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2004), 684-685,794-
795; Stock, “The United States at the Court of Pius IX,” 110. 
11 
 
His Pontificate turned reactionary; he resisted pressure for political and social liberalization, both 
foreign and domestic pressures, and drastically expanded the powers of the Papacy.18  
Liberalism encouraged the uprising that drove Pope Pius from Rome, so the Pope 
opposed liberalism and a united Italy at every turn. As efforts for unification gained greater 
popular support throughout the peninsula, in Rome the Pope became increasingly conservative 
and autocratic in his opposition. After the rebellion, the Pope retaliated by opposing everything 
related to the failed Roman Republic. America had shown some degree of support for the Roman 
Republic and its liberal ideology, so the Papacy’s relationship with the United States suffered as 
a result. As long as the French expressed willingness to militarily uphold the Pope’s secular 
control of Rome, the Pope was free to continue in his opposition to liberalism. 
Beyond the walls of Rome, early successes were achieved in the attempts to unite the 
Italian Peninsula in 1859. War had broken out between the Austrian Empire and the Kingdom of 
Sardinia-Piedmont, with the latter gaining the support of Napoleon III’s Second French 
                                                 
18 Pope Pius IX’s greatest example of conservatism was his profound Syllabus of Errors 
(1864) wherein the Pope viciously attacked liberalism, nationalism, and democracy. While it is 
clear these sentiments drew from his experiences in 1848, he applied his beliefs universally, 
attacking the very principles of separation of Church and State not only in Italy but worldwide. 
No example is clearer in Pius’s treatment of Papal power than in the results of the First Vatican 
Council (1869-1870) which he called. The principle doctrine that derived from that council was 
the dogma of Papal Infallibility. The dogma states that “the Roman Pontiff, when he speaks ex 
cathedra, that is, when in discharge of the office of Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, by virtue 
of his supreme Apostolic authority he defines a doctrine regarding faith and morals to be held by 
the Universal Church, by the divine assistance promised to him in blessed Peter, is possessed of 
that infallibility with which the divine Redeemer willed that His Church should be endowed for 
defining doctrine regarding faith and morals.” Coppa, Pope Pius IX, 147, 167-168. 
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Empire.19 The constitutional monarchy of Piedmont under Victor Emmanuel II held the ideal 
government on which unification could be centered, already controlling several regions, 
Piedmont, Liguria, and Sardinia, and being sufficiently democratic to attract the republicans. As 
such, Piedmontese, French, and pro-unification Italian volunteers captured Lombardy in central-
northern Italy from Austria. They also captured Modena, Parma, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, 
and the Papal Legations, all but the latter holding decisively pro-Austrian sympathies. While 
treaties permitted the annexation of Lombardy, Modena, Parma, and Tuscany, the annexation of 
the Pope’s lands needed greater justification.20 In November, 1860, a plebiscite took place, 
overwhelmingly demanding that the Legations remain under the control of Piedmont. As such, 
all of northern Italy came under the de facto and de jure rule of Victor Emmanuel II.21 
                                                 
19 The French alliance with the Kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont was in part a result of 
Piedmont handing over the sovereignty of Savoy and Nice to the France; the Emperor himself 
was a supporter of Italian unification: he lived in Italy as a Bonapartist exile after his uncle, 
Napoleon, was deposed. Paradoxically, he also was a strong supporter of the Catholic Church, 
protecting Papal control over Rome. Clark, The Italian Risorgimento, 69. 
20 Clark, The Italian Risorgimento, 75-79. 
21 In the Papal Legations, the residents of the Marches voted 133,765 to 1,121 and the 
residents of Umbria voted 97,040 to 360, agreeing to “be part of the constitutional monarchy of 
King Victor Emanuel.” This election, however, was more than a choice between unification and 
Papal secular authority. It was also a contest between the church and feudal landowners. Clark, 
The Italian Risorgimento, 84. 
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The events in the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies took a very different path. Giuseppe 
Garibaldi, from the historically Italian city of Nice, led the Expedition of the Thousand.22 With 
poor-quality weaponry and an army comprised almost entirely of students, Garibaldi was far 
more successful than expected. Landing in Sicily in May 1860, by August he and his men, aided 
by local uprisings, seized the entire island. Naples, the capital of southern Italy, fell in early 
September; by October, all of southern Italy was under Garibaldi’s control as the deposed king 
fled to the besieged fortress of Gaeta and then to Papal Rome. Garibaldi then placed Italian 
Unification ahead of republicanism. This decision was finalized with the plebiscite of October 21 
wherein the people chose to become subjects of Northern Italy’s king; 23 for a romantic 
representation of the unification of the Piedmontese-controlled Northern Italy and the Garibaldi-
controlled Southern Italy, see Figure 3. Victor Emmanuel II and his Piedmontese constitutional 
monarchy controlled the entire Italian Peninsula, Sicily, and Sardinia with the exceptions of 
Austrian-ruled Venetia and the Papal States, then comprising only Rome and its immediate 
surroundings. Victor Emmanuel II of Piedmont-Sardinia was crowned “King of Italy” in March 
of 1861.24 
With the creation of the Kingdom of Italy upon the coronation of its King in 1861, the 
Italian Unification was well underway; the only significant areas that remained outside of the 
                                                 
22 The actual size of the army is known to have been at least 1087, with a few dozen 
additional unnamed soldiers, one a woman. Three-quarters came from Lombardy, Liguria, and 
Venetia in northern Italy; about 100 volunteers came from southern Italy and Sicily. Garibaldi 
originally desired to reclaim his hometown of Nice from the French, but was persuaded to take 
advantage of an uprising in Sicily to rid the peninsula of the Bourbon autocracy. Clark, The 
Italian Risorgimento, 80. 
23 Clark, The Italian Risorgimento, 80-83. 
24 Riall, The Italian Risorgimento, 14. 
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movement’s grasp was Rome, Venice, and their surrounding areas. The process that brought 
together much of Italy had profound implications on the future of diplomacy between the parties 
of the Italian Unification and those of the Civil War. The Italian Unification was driven by the 
ideals of liberalism, an ideal once held even by Pope Pius IX albeit in moderation. Ultimately, 
one event in the Italian Unification had a particularly lasting impact: the revolution that formed 
the Roman Republic. Although a failure, the Roman Republic was part of a larger movement that 
would, a decade later, attain significant success under the auspices of the Kingdom of Sardinia.  
 
Figure 3: Garibaldi meeting with Victor Emmanuel in Teano25 
                                                 
25 The October 26, 1860, meeting of King Victor Emmanuel II (right) who ruled most of 
northern Italy and Giuseppe Garibaldi (left) who ruled all of southern Italy was the formal 
submission of the south to the King, acting upon the plebiscite held five days prior. This is a 
romantic image painted by former Italian Unification soldier and artist Sebastiano De Alvertis. 
Painted around the time of the completion of the Risorgimento in 1870, it is symbolically 
portraying the union of the Italian Peninsula. Fig. 3, Sebastiano De Alvertis, Meeting with Victor 
Emmanuel in Teano, circa 1870. Painting. “File:With Victor Emmanuel.jpg,” Wikipedia, April 8, 
2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/. 
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Its liberalism brought it the support of the American agent in Rome; while the federal 
government did not wholly endorse that position, the United States, unlike all the other states 
represented in Rome, did not choose to follow the Pope into exile. The Pope reacted to the failed 
revolution by opposing everything the Roman Republic embodied, particularly liberalism and a 
united Italy. America’s actions towards the Roman Republic would foster tension in the 
American-Papal relationship that would only grow with America’s later closeness to the united 
Kingdom of Italy. 
The plebiscites that justified the coronation of the King of Italy were not the only 
elections in the fall of 1860. That November, people gathered in the United States to vote in an 
election that would likewise affect the unity of their nation. The election of Republican President 
Abraham Lincoln brought the decades-old slavery debate in the United States to a head. By April 
1861, only weeks after Victor Emmanuel II was crowned King of a mostly united Italy on March 
7, eleven Southern states had seceded from the Union. On April 11, the newly appointed 
representative of the Kingdom of Sardinia, Chevalier Joseph Bertinatti, announced to President 
Lincoln that Victor Emmanuel II had been crowned King of Italy and that the Kingdom of Italy 
had been formed; within hours, in the early morning hours of April 12, Confederate forces 
opened fire on Fort Sumter igniting the American Civil War.26 American diplomats found 
themselves navigating complex political relationships as a new nation, the Confederate States of 
America, sought its own independence. 
                                                 
26 Charles Lanman, Biographical Annals of the Civil Government of the United States: 
During Its First Century (Washington, DC: James Anglim, 1876), 622. 
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At the onset of the war, the United States of America found itself in a favorable political 
position in its relations with Italy as Italian republicans in particular supported the American 
government. The United States, therefore, looked to Italy for help. After the Battle of Fort 
Sumter in April 1861, the Union courted Giuseppe Garibaldi (see Figure 4), asking him to fight 
in the Union Army. Having a figure like Garibaldi as a prominent member of the Union Army 
would provide an effective propaganda tool in garnering the support of Europeans as well as 
recent European immigrants, as Garibaldi remained popular throughout Europe. Further, the 
success of Garibaldi’s Expedition of the Thousand only a year before undoubtedly showed the 
world his military skills. Garibaldi’s conditions, however, were difficult for Abraham Lincoln to  
 
Figure 4: Giuseppe Garibaldi27 
                                                 
27 Fig. 4, Giuseppe Garibaldi, 1866. Photograph. “File:Giuseppe Garibaldi (1866).jpg,” 
Wikipedia, April 8, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/. 
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accept. The Italian revolutionary demanded an immediate declaration that the American Civil 
War was being fought for the goal of abolishing slavery and that Garibaldi himself would serve 
as overall commander of the American military. Even had the Union entertained the conditions, 
it was ultimately Garibaldi who put an end to the offer; Garibaldi was in ill-health and insisted 
that whatever military activities he could conduct would be directed at taking Rome and Venice 
for a united Italy.28 Although not willing to fight, Garibaldi’s support for the Union did not 
waiver. In April 1862, the United States Ambassador to Italy, George Perkins Marsh, met with 
Garibaldi. Marsh noted that the Italian revolutionary “manifested the same warm interest he has 
always shown in the triumph of the Union cause, and the same high respect for the wisdom of 
the present administration which I have the pleasure of hearing expressed in every quarter with 
which my position brings me into relation.”29 
As Marsh testified, Giuseppe Garibaldi’s support for the Union was not unique. In the 
autumn of 1862, Colonel Giovanni Battista Cattabeni offered to organize four battalions of five 
hundred experienced soldiers each to fight for the Union Army. Claiming the support of the 
Italian King, Cattabeni promised that his troops would obtain their own weaponry; his only 
request was that the United States provide transportation for the two thousand men to travel to 
America. The request was declined by the Union, citing Constitutional questions regarding 
                                                 
28 Frank W. Alduino and David J. Coles, Sons of Garibaldi in Blue and Grey 
(Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2007), 31-35. 
29 United States Department of State, “Message of the President of the United Sates to the 
Two Houses of Congress at the Commencement of the Third Session of the Thirty-seventh 
Congress (1862),” in The Foreign Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2003), 579. 
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providing the funds.30 Italians who did not need such transportation – those Italians living in the 
United States – formed their own regiments and fought for the Union. Most notable was the 
Thirty-ninth New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment, comprised of 1,086 immigrants from 
eleven different European nations, including one company of Italians, founded just weeks after 
the war began. The regiment was nicknamed the “Garibaldi Guard.” One important aspect of the 
Thirty-ninth New York Volunteer Infantry Regiment was its regimental colors, the three flags 
flown by and representing the regiment (see Figure 5). The first was an American flag with the 
phrase “Garibaldi Guard” inscribed upon it. The second was a Hungarian flag inscribed with 
Vivecere aut morire on the obverse and the phrase’s translation, Conquer or Die, on the reverse. 
The most significant flag, however, was the third. It was an Italian tricolor inscribed with the 
phrase Dio E Popolo, meaning God and the People. This flag was the same that was flown by 
Garibaldi himself in the revolutions of 1848, most notably during the Roman Republic.31 
                                                 
30 Alduino, 51; United States Department of State, “Message of the president of the 
United States, and accompanying documents, to the two houses of Congress, at the 
commencement of the first session of the thirty-eighth congress (1863),” in The Foreign Policy 
of the United States (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 2003), 1155-1156. 
31 Alduino, Sons of Garibaldi in Blue and Grey, 52. 
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Figure 5: Review of Federal Troops on the Fourth of July by President Lincoln and General 
Scott: The Garibaldi Guard Filing Past32 
The relationship between the United States and the Italian Kingdom was not one-sided. 
The Union appeared eager to demonstrate its affinity for the Kingdom of Italy. Naval visits 
provided an ideal opportunity for displaying the good relations between the two nations. Two 
such visits occurred in November, 1863. First, the Italian steam frigate Don Giovani visited the 
port of Boston with the crew being hosted by dignitaries including Governor John Albion 
Andrew of Massachusetts.33 Within a week, the line-of-battle ship Re Galantuomo, a prize of 
                                                 
32 Not only does this figure depict the troops of the Garibaldi Guard, but it also clearly 
displays the three regimental colors. The flag in the front is the flag flown by Giuseppe Garibaldi 
himself during the revolution of 1848. Fig. 5: Edmond Ollier, Review of Federal Troops on the 
Fourth of July by President Lincoln and General Scott: The Garibaldi Guard Filing Past, cerca 
1880. Print. “File:March past of the 'Garibaldi Guard' before President Lincoln, 1861-1865 
(c1880).jpg” reproduced from the Illustrated London News, Wikipedia, April 8, 2013, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/.  
33 “Visit of Italian Naval Officers to Boston,” New York Herald, November 6, 1863. 
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Garibaldi’s conquest of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, arrived in New York with 350 officers 
and crew. During this visit, New York shipbuilder William H. Webb delivered an important 
product that the Italians had purchased: an ironclad warship. This ship, the Re d’Italia, would be 
among Italy’s first ironclads, iron-plated warships that drastically revolutionized naval warfare 
by outcompeting previous wooden ships. The ceremonial commissioning of this historic ship 
took place in the port of New York before the watchful eyes of America’s largest city. The Re 
Galantuomo would then escort the newly-christened ironclad to Italian waters. 34 In the following 
months, the event was repeated once more when Webb provided the Italians the ironclad warship 
Re di Portogallo.35 
The Italian relationship with the United States was so close that the Italians felt no 
hesitancy in both purchasing ships from one participant in the Civil War and in commissioning 
those ships in American waters. This showed the disregard Italy felt towards the Confederacy. 
Italy was willing to purchase military vessels and operate proudly in the largest cities in the 
North. At the same time, the sale of the two ironclads to the Royal Italian Navy demonstrates 
that the United States was willing to cement its close relationship with Italy by significantly 
arming them. In doing so, the Union was also showing a willingness to indirectly oppose through 
military aid the enemies of Italy and the Italian Unification, namely the Austrian Empire and the 
Papacy. The intended audience for the sale, however, was not simply Italy or even Austria and 
                                                 
34 “Our Italian Visitors: The Italian Line-of-Battle Ship Re Galantuomo, The Object of 
her Visit, The Re d’Italia to be Convoyed to Italy, The New American Built Italian Iron-Clad,” 
New York Herald, November 6, 1863. 
35 “Our Italian Visitors: The Italian Line-of-Battle Ship Re Galantuomo, The Object of 
her Visit, The Re d’Italia to be Convoyed to Italy, The New American Built Italian Iron-Clad,” 
New York Herald, November 6, 1863. 
21 
 
the Papacy. Rather, by constructing numerous formidable ironclads and selling two of them 
rather than entering them all into service in the United States Navy in the midst of the Civil War, 
the Union made a symbolic gesture to the powers of Europe. The Civil War was not a total war 
in the North. The Union could still expand its armaments if necessary as it had the capacity for 
surplus production exemplified by the vessels sold to Italy. The Union’s sale of ironclad 
warships to Italy therein served as a deterrent to rival powers such as the British and the French 
if they chose to take advantage of America’s wartime weaknesses.36 
As the Civil War progressed, Italy served as a valuable ally to the United States 
benefiting the Union in several ways. Over the course of the Civil War, this relationship was 
manifested in several ways. In terms of troops, many Italian immigrants and immigrants from 
nearly a dozen other European countries fought under the heroic image of Giuseppe Garibaldi. 
American shipbuilders provided ironclads to their Italian friends; in return, the United States was 
able to express that its abilities were not entirely limited by the Civil War. Italians in Italy 
offered their services to the Union and the Union sought the service of Giuseppe Garibaldi, but 
neither of these two efforts ultimately succeeded as the Union rebuffed the efforts of the Italian 
soldiers and Garibaldi rebuffed the efforts of the Union. The mere offers, though, revealed how 
                                                 
36 The timing, although likely coincidental, is certainly symbolic. November 1863 was 
the two year anniversary of the beginning of the Trent Affair. That diplomatic incident, centering 
on the Union seizure of Confederate diplomats assigned to the European powers from a British 
ship, the RMS Trent, arguably brought Great Britain to the brink of war with the United States, 
only ending when the Union released the Confederate diplomats to continue their mission. The 
threat was certainly not empty as the British Empire had significant military forces in British 
North America. The French Empire, likewise, were building a sizable force in Mexico. With 
such a foreign presence on America’s borders, the message the Union sent by revealing its 
capacity for producing surplus ironclads even in the middle of a war served as a notable 
deterrent. For an overview of the Trent Affair, see: Norman Ferris, The Trent Affair: A 
Diplomatic Crisis (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977). 
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close the relationship between the Union and the Kingdom of Italy were – so close that 
volunteers in Italy openly desired to fight and die for an ally while the Union was willing to look 
beyond its borders to Italy for military leadership. 
The closeness between the United States and the Kingdom of Italy, however, was not 
without its negative consequences. The Union-Italian friendship had a chilling effect on 
America’s relationship with the Austrian Empire in particular. Realizing that naval superiority 
would be important in the event of an Italian conquest of Austrian-ruled Venice, the sale of 
American ironclads to an Italian government seeking unification was seen as worrisome to the 
defensive Austrians.37 In reaction, the Austrians found themselves more willing to enter into 
negotiations with the Confederate States of America, particularly through selling ships to them. 
The negotiations were between Confederate agent Louis Merton and, later, Captain Caleb Huse 
and Austrian Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian, the future Emperor of Mexico. The negotiations 
centered on Confederate attempts to purchase ironclads from the Austrians. The Austrians were 
hesitant; they feared an impending conflict with Italy and, unlike the United States, did not wish 
to sell ironclads to navies beyond the Imperial Austrian Navy itself. As such, the Austrian 
government refused to sell ironclads or allow private Austrian shipbuilders to sell ironclads to 
the South, instead suggesting the Confederates purchase several available wooden ships – a 
steam frigate, two corvettes, and an assortment of nearly two dozen smaller vessels and 
                                                 
37 It should be noted that the two United States-built ironclads, the Re d’Italia and the Re 
Portogallo, were to augment ironclad warships then-still being built in France for the Royal 
Italian Navy, the Roma, the Panezia, the Regina Maria, and Don Louis. “Our Italian Visitors: 
The Italian Line-of-Battle Ship Re Galantuomo, The Object of her Visit, The Re d’Italia to be 
Convoyed to Italy, The New American Built Italian Iron-Clad,” New York Herald, November 6, 
1863. 
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gunships. The Confederacy ultimately decided that the prices set for the wooden ships were 
increasingly unfeasible as the war progressed.38 While the Union’s relationship with Italy caused 
tension with the Austrian Empire, tension that materialized in Austrian offers to sell ships to the 
Confederacy, the failure of the Confederacy to act upon those offers meant that the Union’s 
problems with Austria bore no concrete repercussions in the Civil War.39 
Even as America’s support for Italy created tension between the United States and 
Austria, another country on the Italian Peninsula turned to America for support in the midst of 
the Risorgimento: the Most Serene Republic of San Marino. San Marino was and still is an 
independent nation of twenty-four square miles; at the time, only about a thousand families 
nestled in the central Italian Apennine Mountains. The tiny state holds the distinction of being 
the world’s oldest continually operating republic with a republican tradition dating to its 
founding in 301 A.D. by Christians fleeing Roman persecution and its current constitutional 
rules dating to 1600. With its long history of independent republican traditions, San Marino did 
not desire incorporation into a larger Italian kingdom. The Sammarinese were likewise 
opponents of regional despotism and naturally opened their borders and extended their protection 
to liberal pro-unification figures such as Giuseppe Garibaldi while he was fleeing the collapsing 
                                                 
38 Jack Greene and Alessandro Massignani, Ironclads at War: The Origin and 
Development of the Armored Battleship (Boston: Da Capo Press, 2008), 91. 
39 In an interesting twist of fate, the American-built Italian ironclads Re d’Italia and Re 
Portogallo would meet the steam frigate almost sold to the Confederacy, the Austrian Radetzky, 
in open battle in 1866 off the Austrian-ruled Dalmatian island of Lissa (modern day Vas, 
Croatia). The wooden Radetzky supported a fleet of Austrian ironclads as they engaged a fleet of 
Italian ironclads including the Re d’Italia and the Re Portogallo. In this, the first battle between 
ironclad fleets, the Austrians proved victorious in battle, succeeding in even sinking the Union’s 
first wartime ironclad sale, the Re d’Italia. Greene, Ironclads at War, 119. 
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Roman Republic. Since San Marino’s very founding by Roman Christian refugees, San Marino 
has had a long tradition of accepting the exiled. San Marino hoped that its treatment of Italian 
unifiers would preserve it from the unification. In an attempt to augment Sammarinese safety, 
San Marino reached out to President Abraham Lincoln, the leader of one of the few other 
republics in the world at that time. 40 
On March 29, 1861, the Regent Captains, the two elected Sammarinese executives, wrote 
a letter, in both Italian and imperfect English, to the American president, erroneously addressed 
to New York rather than Washington. “It is a some while since the Republic of San Marino 
wishes to make alliance with the United States of America in that manner as it is possible 
between a great Potency and a very small country.”41 The letter further relayed that the Council 
of San Marino had extended Sammarinese citizenship to President Lincoln. In his reply in early 
May of that year, Lincoln, addressing the Regent Captains as “Great and Good Friends,” wrote 
that “although your dominion is small, your State is nevertheless one of the most honored, in all 
history. It has by its experience demonstrated the truth, so full of encouragement to the friends of 
Humanity, that Government founded on Republican principles is capable of being so 
administered as to be secure and enduring.” 42 As such, Lincoln looked upon the small republic 
                                                 
40 Don H. Doyle, “From San Marino, With Love,” The New York Times, March 28, 2011. 
41 As quoted by Don H. Doyle, “From San Marino, With Love,” The New York Times, 
March 28, 2011. Note that the several grammatical errors are original to the Regent Captains; in 
their letter they wrote, “We have wished to write to you in our own hand and in English, 
although we have little knowledge and no practice in the language.” 
42 Abraham Lincoln, “To the Regent Captains of the Republic of San Marino,” in 
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, edited by Roy P. Basler, 4 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press, 1953), 360. 
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with its significant longevity as an inspiration in the face of America’s own crisis. He further 
thanked the Council of San Marino for “the honor of citizenship it conferred upon me.”43 While 
Lincoln’s letter certainly signaled his affection for that nation and his acceptance of citizenship 
was groundbreaking, Lincoln’s assistance was ultimately not needed and the United States was 
never forced to choose between its affection for the small albeit republican San Marino and that 
for the liberal Kingdom of Italy. Garibaldi chose to lobby on behalf of the tiny state and the 
Italian kingdom never annexed San Marino.44 As such, the Union’s relationship with the 
Sammarinese was unlike that with Austria. America’s closeness with Italy was, for San Marino, 
not seen as a constraint as it was for Austria. Rather, America was a natural ideological ally of 
the small nation and the Union’s close relationship with Italy was a further asset in seeking 
friendship with Italy. 
While San Marino was spared from Italian Unification, the Risorgimento ultimately did 
bring much of Italy together under a single government united around the constitutional monarch 
centered in Piedmont. A mixture of Piedmontese soldiers, French interventionists, and Italian 
republicans notably under Garibaldi fought and, in 1860, succeeded in uniting most of northern 
Italy and all of southern Italy into one nation, the Kingdom of Italy. Throughout the American 
Civil War, that kingdom, particularly its liberal elements, grew close to an embattled republic on 
the other side of the Atlantic, the Unites States of America, and that closeness was mutual. The 
crowning of Victor Emmanuel II as King of Italy, however, marked only a partial completion of 
the Italian Unification. Austrian-ruled Veneto, San Marino, and the Papal States remained 
                                                 
43 Abraham Lincoln, “To the Regent Captains of the Republic of San Marino,” Collected 
Works of Abraham Lincoln, 4: 360. 
44 Don H. Doyle, “From San Marino, With Love,” The New York Times, March 28, 2011. 
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outside the grasps of the Risorgimento. Italy’s close relationship with the Union, therefore, 
worsened their relations with the opponents of Italy. Austria reacted to the Union-Italian 
closeness by opening dialogue and offering to sell some ships to the Confederacy. San Marino, 
in contrast, drew closer to the United States to help fortify its own position amidst the Italian 
Unification. The Confederacy’s inability to purchase Austrian wooden ships and the Austria’s 
unwillingness to do anything greater, along with Garibaldi’s protection of San Marino, blunted 
the negative impacts of the Union’s relationship with Italy with regard to Austria and San 
Marino. The Papal States, in contrast, reacted to the Union-Italian relationship coldly and 
showed far greater warmth to the Confederacy than others. In the end, the United States felt that 
its closeness to Italy was more valuable than any of the real or potential negative consequences 
that relationship might have caused. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE CONFEDERACY AND THE PAPAL STATES 
The Papacy’s reaction to the Civil War was complex and often misunderstood, and its 
true nature would be debated for decades after the war ended, the Papal States ceased to exist, 
and the Italian Unification attained its ultimate success. The Pontiff’s relationship with the 
parties in the Civil War began in the context of an already strained relationship between the 
Union and the Papacy, a relationship born in the Pope’s strong anti-unification, anti-liberal 
reaction to the Roman Republic. The Union’s close ties with the Kingdom of Italy, a kingdom 
openly desiring to conquer Rome, threatened America’s relations with Pope Pius IX. Rather than 
reaching out to America as a potential ally, the Papal States reacted coldly, much like the 
Austrian Empire had. From the Vatican’s perspective, the United States attempted, 
unsuccessfully, to employ Giuseppe Garibaldi, a revolutionary who actively sought the Pope’s 
secular downfall; further, an American regiment fought for the United States under the same flag 
that was flown by the Roman Republic, the same people who drove the Pope into exile a decade 
earlier. 
In the context of a weakened Union-Papal relationship, the Confederacy had the 
opportunity for diplomatic outreach to Pope Pius IX. The two states shared many things in 
common: they were both entangled in conflicts where their opponents were trying to subjugate 
them into larger liberal nations. As a result, the Pope offered his sympathy, but little more. 
Despite Confederate hopes of Papal recognition, which brought with it the hope of French and 
Catholic European recognition and even intervention, Pope Pius never recognized Confederate 
independence. The Confederacy, however, would try to distort the Pope’s sympathy into an 
argument that the Pontiff did recognize the Confederacy for Catholic audiences in the North and 
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in Ireland. The Papacy, in contrast, had its own motivations: preserving the temporal authority of 
the Pope. To that end, mediation provided the Papal States with a purpose in the international 
community that would justify their existence. To that end, the Pope needed to maintain good 
relations with the United States, preferably a relationship so trusting that the United States would 
submit itself to Papal mediation. This, however, was hampered by the nature of Union 
diplomacy. 
For the formal policy of the United States toward the Papal States, American Secretary of 
State William H. Seward, on April 29, 1861, instructed Rufus King, the new American 
representative in Rome, that he must assure the Pope that the United States “will not violate the 
friendship already so happily existing by any intervention in the domestic affairs of the States of 
the Church.” King was to request of the Pope that he remain “a friend to peace, to good order, 
and to the cause of human nature, which is now, as it always had been, our cause.” The Vatican 
should also “exercise its great influence in favor of a course of natural justice among nations.”45 
The United States wanted Papal neutrality in exchange for American neutrality in Italian 
Unification.46 Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, the Cardinal Secretary of State, second in authority 
                                                 
45 United States Department of State, “Message of the President of the United States to 
the two houses of Congress, at the commencement of the second session of the thirty-seventh 
congress (1861),” in The Foreign Policy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: G.P.O., 2003), 
291. 
46 This sentiment echoes the overall nature in which the United States had dealt with the 
Papal States: they treated it as relations with a sovereign country, not as relations with the 
Catholic Church. Secretary James Buchanan in the first instructions to the first minister to the 
Papal States: 
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only to the Pope himself, advocated neutrality, noting that Catholic Americans would not take 
part in the conflict as Catholics, but only as citizens (see Figure 6). There was, however, a 
commonality in the outlook of the Papacy and that of the United States. In 1848, it was an 
insurrection that toppled Papal authority in Rome, just as it was an insurrection in the United 
States that threated American unity. Cardinal Antonelli expressed this common distrust for 
popular uprisings in a private meeting with the American minister, John P. Stockton.47 Cardinal 
Antonelli further argued that “the government of his holiness concerns itself mainly in spiritual 
matters, but we are the supporters of law and order everywhere.”48 
These Papal communications during the opening weeks of the war reflect the same 
principle held by the United States during the revolution of 1848 in Rome: do not recognize a 
revolutionary state until it has proven that it is capable of surviving. As the war continued, the 
survivability of the Confederacy became more and more apparent to the Papacy. Simultaneously, 
rather than maintaining strong relations to ensure Papal support for the North or at least 
                                                 
There is one consideration which you ought always to keep in view in your 
intercourse with the Papal States. Most if not all the governments which have 
diplomatic representatives at Rome are connected with the Pope as the head of the 
Catholic Church. In this respect the government of the United States occupies an 
entirely different position. It possesses no power whatever over the question of 
religion. […] Your efforts, therefore, will be devoted exclusively to the 
cultivation of the most friendly civil relations with the Papal government and the 
extension of commerce between the two countries. You will carefully avoid even 
the appearance of interfering in ecclesiastical questions where these relate to the 
United States or any other portion of the world. 
Stock, “The United States at the Court of Pius IX,” 105. 
47 David J. Alvarez, “The Papacy in the Diplomacy in the American Civil War,” The 
Catholic Historical Review 69, 2 (April 1983): 230. 
48 United States Department of State, “Message of the President of the United States 
(1861),” 292. 
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Figure 6: Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli49 
neutrality, the United States unofficially severed relations with Pius IX, thanks to incompetent or 
absent ministers. Rufus King, the incoming United States Minister to the Papal States, never 
reached Rome. Upon hearing of the outbreak of war, he took a leave of absence to serve as a 
Union general. Former Wisconsin Governor Alexander Randall was then selected to become the 
United States’ representative in the summer of 1861; Randall delayed his departure for the Italian 
Peninsula. After Secretary Seward’s personal intervention, Randall finally arrived in Rome in 
late May of 1862, the first minister in Rome in one year and one month. Upon arrival, Randall 
judged himself unfit for duty as he spoke no foreign languages and lacked the social skills 
                                                 
49 Fig. 6, Josef Mukařovský, Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli, 1876. Print. “File:Giacomo 
Antonelli Mukarovsky.png,” Wikipedia, April 8, 2013, http://en.wikipedia.org/. 
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necessary for a royal court; he departed by that summer. His successor, Richard Blatchford 
arrived by mid-November.50 
With American diplomatic relations with the Papal States practically nonexistent for the 
first year and a half of the American Civil War, a fine opportunity presented itself to Confederate 
diplomats. While the relationship between the Union and the Papacy was maintained because the 
Pope did not wish to forsake an increasingly victorious government, it was ultimately a 
relationship built on uncertainty. American liberals nearly recognized the Roman Republic that 
murdered a close associate of Pius IX. Nor did America hide its desire to see the anti-Papal, 
Garibaldi fighting amongst its ranks. The Confederate States of America, therefore, had an 
opportunity to establish cordial relations with Pius IX. 
As the tensions between the United States and the Papal States presented the Confederacy 
with the opportunity for a diplomatic coup, the unique position of the Papal States as the head of 
the Roman Catholic Church complicated the abilities for nations with a Protestant majority to 
enter into diplomatic relations. The United States had dealt with this issue when, in the late 
1840s, the State Department had refused to enter into relations with the Papacy as a religious 
power out of respect for the principle of the separation of church and state; they would only 
negotiate with the Pope as the secular head of central Italy.51 The Confederacy, in contrast, 
sought to negotiate with not only the secular rulers of the city of Rome but also those same rulers 
in their capacity as leaders of the Roman Catholic Church, whose members were widespread in 
                                                 
50 Alvarez, “The Papacy in the Diplomacy in the American Civil War,” 231-237. 
51 For further details, see footnote 45. Stock, “The United States at the Court of Pius IX,” 
105. 
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the North and in Europe. This approach was only possible for the Confederacy because of the 
unique position of Catholicism in the South. Despite being overwhelming Protestant, a relatively 
positive attitude towards Southern Catholicism allowed Confederate diplomats to act far more 
freely in their interaction with the Papal States, especially with that nation in its capacity as the 
head of the Catholic Church, than could have been allowed in more nativist regions. The 
Catholic population was small throughout the United States, 12.1 percent in the North in 1860 
and 5.4 percent of the South. The smaller Southern Catholic population meant that, for many 
Southern Protestants, Papal diplomatic relations were an abstract matter of foreign policy rather 
than an action that would threaten Protestantism on the home front. Further, Catholics in the 
South, despite the smaller population, had held the most political liberties. By 1835, no Southern 
state maintained constitutional restrictions on Catholics and anti-Catholic violence was less 
widespread than in the North. Partly, this is because several southern states, particularly 
Maryland, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, Texas, and Florida, had native-born Catholic 
populations, especially in New Orleans, which at one time had the largest Catholic population in 
the country. In the South, to be a Catholic did not necessarily mean that you were an immigrant, 
as it often did in the North.52 
Catholics too acted to reinforce their regional loyalty. The future Confederate envoy to 
the Papal States, Bishop Patrick Lynch of Charleston, South Carolina, advocated strongly for the 
Confederate cause from the very beginning of the war. Upon evacuating Fort Sumter, then-
Captain Abner Doubleday, a Union officer at the fort, noted that, “It is worthy of remark that, 
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33 
 
after we had left the harbor, Bishop Lynch, of Charleston, threw the Catholic influence in favor 
of the Secessionists by celebrating the Southern victory by a grand Te Deum.”53 The bishop also 
made several speeches calling for the Catholic men of Charleston, many of them Irishmen like 
himself, to enlist in the Confederate Army; his recruiting was noted for its success. As such, he 
earned the respect of many Southerners regardless of religion.54  
Further, the anti-Catholic nativism that swept much of the United States in the decade 
before the Civil War was less persistent in the South and several key Southern individuals had 
escaped it. Confederate President Jefferson Davis, for example, despite his Episcopalian faith, 
attended St. Thomas College, a Catholic institution.55A larger example of the influence of 
Catholicism on Southern politics can be seen before the war, in 1848. In that year, the legislature 
of Louisiana passed a resolution “commendatory of Pope Pius IX, and in favor of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with the court of Rome.”56 This act of the Louisiana Senate 
and House of Representatives praised Pope Pius IX for his then-reform-minded approach to the 
governing of central Italy and declared the state’s support for such endeavors. The resolution 
went as far as to “hail him as the instrument destined by Divine Providence to accomplish the 
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political regeneration of Italy.”57 The unique position of Southern Catholicism even within the 
Southern political establishment allowed the Confederacy to pursue close relations with the Pope 
without risking domestic anti-Catholic fervor in response. 
While the tension between the Union and the Papal States presented the Confederacy 
with the opportunity for diplomacy and the position of Catholicism in the South made it possible, 
the Confederacy also had the motivation to reach out to Pope Pius IX. The Papacy, a government 
that controlled only one naval boat and too few troops to be able to maintain its own sovereignty 
without French support, retained many appealing characteristics for the Confederacy. The 
support of the Papacy, the Confederacy hoped, would greatly diminish the enthusiasm of 
Catholic German and Irish immigrants for serving in the Union Army. Further, powerful 
Catholic political forces in Maryland and Missouri might become increasingly supportive of 
secession. Catholicism was also a highly influential religion in Europe. With the support of the 
Pope, Confederates hoped that Catholic European nations might begin to recognize the 
Confederacy, particularly France which already had troops in nearby Mexico.58 
Simply being recognized by the Pope, however, did not guarantee universal or even 
widespread support in Catholic European countries. France, in particular, had a lengthy history 
of conflict between two ideological factions within its Catholic population, the pro-Papal 
ultramontane faction and the nationalist Gallican faction. The Frenchmen who held the 
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ultramontane ideology advocated for direct Papal control of the Catholic Church in France as 
well as recognized the Pope’s right to direct intervention in the political affairs of European 
nations. Gallicanism, in contrast, supported greater autonomy for the French Catholic Church, 
deriving its own name from that of ancient Gaul, an older name for what is now France. This 
desire for autonomy from Roman control extended into politics, as many Gallicanists refuted 
Papal politic influence. As such, many Gallicanists supported, or at least did not oppose, Italian 
unification. It should be remembered that Gallicanism was, in fact, an ideology deriving from the 
Catholic Church and whose adherents were themselves Catholics, up to and including French 
Catholic bishops. This religio-political dichotomy repeated itself throughout much of the 
Catholic world.59 As such, Confederate hopes to use Papal recognition to bring about diplomatic 
recognition from Catholic nations hinged on the balance of power between the ultramontane 
factions and the Gallicanist factions in France or their equivalents in any given Catholic country; 
even an overt and emphatic announcement of Papal support for the Confederacy would not 
necessarily draw the diplomatic recognition of every Catholic-dominated nation. 
While Papal recognition was certainly not a one-step solution to the Confederacy’s 
diplomatic woes, it nonetheless held valuable potential. The ideal situation for the Confederacy 
was not just an international consensus to bring about domestic pressure, but rather for a pro-
Confederate military intervention, most notably by the French who were well-situated. In 
December 1861, a dispute over the failure of Mexico to pay its foreign debts resulted in a 
multinational presence in the Confederacy's southern neighbor. When intimidation failed, the 
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military campaign commenced. The invasion, however, progressed further than several nations 
were willing to go. The British and Spanish forces withdrew as it became clear that Napoleon III 
did not desire simply to seek restitution of the financial debts but rather to conquer the entire 
nation. In June of 1863, three months before Jefferson Davis penned his letter to Pope Pius IX, 
French troops seized Mexico City. At the height of the French occupation of Mexico, the French 
Imperial Army had over 40,000 troops in that country and in April 1864 went so far as imposing 
a hand-selected emperor, the Austrian Archduke, Maximilian.60 With such events occurring 
across the Confederate-Mexican border, Confederate diplomats wanted the French, with an army 
already present in the region, to aid them in their own war. Further, despite the relatively small 
size of the French forces, many Confederates remembered that it was with the aid of the French 
military that the Patriots won the American Revolution.61 
Confederate negotiations directly with the French government did not progress to 
diplomatic recognition let alone French military aid. Using the pressure of the Papacy, however, 
might have proven to be a more fruitful tactic in rousing French support. After all, French 
willingness to support the Papacy militarily had been well fortified when the French government 
sent its armies into central Italy to restore Pius IX to his Papal throne in 1849, bringing an end to 
the Roman Republic. Further, once the French returned the Pope to his temporal power, they 
remained, posing a potent deterrent to any military attempts at unification. The significance of 
the Papal influence should not be underestimated. In France, the former President and later 
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Emperor Napoleon III had been involved in pro-unification politics while in exile in Italy 
following the collapse of his uncle Napoleon I’s empire. In 1859, Napoleon III used his forces to 
fight alongside the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia against the Austrian Empire, eventually 
aiding in the conquest of Lombardy for the cause of the Italian unification.62 As such, Pius IX 
receiving protection from the French Army, an army who directly aided the Pope’s enemies 
elsewhere on the Italian Peninsula, showed the extent of the political influence of the Papacy, 
particularly through the religio-political ideology of ultramontanism. 
During Napoleon III’s reign, ultramontane French political forces wielded significant 
influence, challenging the French Italianissimes, the Gallicanists who aggressively desired 
support for a united Italy. The conflict between the ultramontane and the Gallicanist 
Italianissimes divided French political parties and even French Catholics. To compromise 
between the competing political interests, the Emperor decided to support Italy in places where 
its growth would not directly threaten the Papacy, but where it did threaten Rome, France would 
support the Pope.63 As such, Papal recognition of the Confederacy might have only had limited 
influence in France, restricted to the ultramontane politicians, albeit the ultramontane political 
forces could have succeeded in a persuading French action as it did in central Italy. 
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Although Papal support could not guarantee Catholic European support, it could lead to 
significant success in pursuing that goal. As such, the Confederacy had strong motivations to 
seek diplomatic recognition from the Papacy. Catholicism was a powerful political force in many 
Catholic countries, particularly in Europe. Papal support for the Confederacy, therefore, could 
serve as leverage pushing European leaders to follow the Papal example and endorse 
Confederate independence. The ultimate endorsement, however, could only fully be done by the 
French Emperor given his position in neighboring Mexico: military intervention. Papal support, 
even if it had happened, should not be exaggerated though. Catholics, then and now, do not 
follow the political authority of the Pope absolutely as though he were a universal dictator of 
Catholics. Political divisions existed throughout the Catholic world, especially in France, 
between the supports of the Pope politically and those who restricted his influence to only 
matters of religion. As such, even the strongest and most unambiguous letter of Pope Pius would 
only rouse Catholic support where the Pope’s political supporters held political control of their 
nation’s foreign policy. That possibility of support, though, if it did materialize as a result of 
Papal recognition, could have altered the course of the war. 
Armed with opportunity as a result of American-Papal tensions, ability as a result of the 
position of Catholicism in the South, and motivation as a result of the Union’s recruitment of 
Catholic immigrants and particularly the geopolitical position of Catholic France, the 
Confederacy began to engage diplomatically with the Roman Pontiff in 1862.  As part of a larger 
effort to gain recognition for the Confederacy from various states throughout Europe, 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis appointed three commissioners to represent the 
Confederacy in Europe: Pierre A. Rost, William L. Yancey, and Ambrose Dudley Mann (see 
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Figure 7).64 The last would eventually travel to Rome and prove decisive in Confederate 
relations there, acting as the messenger and an interpreter of messages between the Papal and 
Confederate governments. 
 
Figure 7: The Hon. A. Dudley Mann, one of the three commissioners of the Confederate States 
of America to Europe65 
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The attempts at gaining diplomatic recognition for the Confederacy from the Papacy 
began in response to an event on October 18, 1862, when Pius IX sent two letters to America: 
one to the Archbishop of New York, John Hughes, and the other to the Archbishop of New 
Orleans, Jean-Marie Odin.66 These men served as the archbishops of the largest dioceses in the 
North and the South, respectively. By late 1862, the bloodshed caused by the war led Pius IX to 
call for peace; the letter sent to both sides of the conflict served that purpose. The letter to 
Archbishop Hughes, for example, urged him “to exhort, with your eminent piety and episcopal 
zeal, your clergy and faithful to offer up their prayers, and also apply all your study and exertion, 
with the people and their chief ruler, to restore forthwith the desired tranquility and peace by 
which the happiness of both the Christian and the civil republic is principally maintained.” Pius 
IX asked that he take “every pains[sic], besides, to cause the people and their chief rulers 
seriously to reflect on the grievous evils with which they are afflicted, and which are the result of 
civil war, the direst, most destructive and dismal of all the evils that could befall a people or 
nation.” Archbishop Odin received the same message.67 
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Although New Orleans had already been under Union occupation for five months when 
Pope Pius wrote his letter to the Archbishop of that city, Confederate President Jefferson Davis 
decided to respond personally to the Pope, writing in September of 1863. Davis did not do so 
simply as a gesture of politeness or gratitude but rather as part of a concerted diplomatic effort to 
gain the Pope’s favor and, ideally, full diplomatic recognition. One important figure in this 
decision was a Confederate Catholic chaplain, born in Ireland and living in Missouri, Father John 
Bannon. Father Bannon was approached by the Confederate government and asked to lead a 
mission to Ireland to try to dissuade Irishmen from immigrating to the North and enlisting in its 
military. The timing was important as manpower was increasingly an issue as Irish immigration 
to the North continued and even grew as Northern recruitment efforts expanded. Before 
departing for Europe, Father Bannon met with Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin 
and President Davis in Richmond in the opening days of September, 1863. The priest, in those 
meetings, suggested that the Confederacy open discussions with Pope Pius IX with the intention 
of gaining Papal diplomatic recognition to not only aid in his counter-recruitment in Ireland but 
also as part of a larger Confederate diplomatic effort to gain widespread recognition in Europe.68 
Davis’s heartfelt expression of thanks to Pope Pius IX on September 23, 1863, was 
coupled with his own prayers for peace: “we have offered at the foot-stool of our Father who is 
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in Heaven prayers inspired by the same feelings which animate your Holiness.”69 He echoed the 
Pope’s own call for peace as requested of the two archbishops. In doing so, President Davis 
presented himself and his nation as righteous peacemakers that had no part in the cause or 
perpetuation of the war. Given the nature of a two-sided war, Davis was suddenly redirecting the 
Pope’s call for peace from being aimed at both sides of the conflict to solely the Union. Further, 
Davis’s argument expounded on the very heart of Confederate motivations in regard to the 
conflict, stating that the Confederate people “desire no evil to our enemies, nor do we covet any 
of their possessions, but are only struggling to the end that they shall cease to devastate our land 
and inflict useless and cruel slaughter upon our people, and that we be permitted to live at peace 
with all mankind, under our own laws and institutions, which protect every man in the enjoyment 
not only of his temporal rights, but of worshipping God according to his own faith.”70 Davis 
cunningly stressed that freedom of religion for Catholics, among others groups, was at the very 
core of the Confederacy’s existence, insinuating that, as the war was one for independence, such 
freedom for Catholics was not present in the Union. 
In October, Father John Bannon arrived in Rome to meet with the Pope before traveling 
to Ireland. In his talk with Pius IX, the Irish priest from Missouri defended the Confederacy, 
argued for the moral superiority of the Confederate cause, and attacked the Union’s use of 
foreign soldiers. Father Bannon felt the Pope reacted positively to the Confederate cause.71 It has 
been suggested that at this meeting, Father Bannon hand-delivered President Davis’s letter to the 
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Pontiff,72 but that occurred more formally a few weeks later. In November 1863,73 A. Dudley 
Mann presented a copy of Jefferson Davis’s letter to the Pope in an audience with Pius IX and 
Cardinal Antonelli. At that meeting, Mann reiterated many of the arguments Father Bannon 
made, using the opportunity to further weaken the Papal-Union relationship by attacking the 
Northern policy of recruiting European, mostly Catholic, immigrants into the Union Army to 
serve, as Mann and Father Bannon argued, in the most dangerous positions as cannon fodder. 
Mann defended the Southern institution of slavery, arguing the central government could not act 
on the issue because of the separation of state and centralized powers and that Southern slaves 
lived better lives than free blacks.74 London newspapers reported on the meeting.75 They 
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characterized the meeting far more directly. They reported that the Confederate purpose was 
more radical than simply an attempt to strengthen relations; rather, they wrote that the 
Confederacy openly invited the Pope to mediate the Civil War. In reply, “The Pope is reported to 
have answered to the envoys of President Davis, whom he received with affectionate simplicity, 
that he would feel himself happy to fulful [sic] such a holy mission of his ministry, if President 
Lincoln, following the example of Mr. Davis, would consent to accept the paternal intervention 
of the Vicar of Christ.”76 The article never received widespread syndication and conflicted in 
some details with other known facts, principally the date of the meeting, but it did reveal a 
certain understanding of the Papal-Confederate relationship: the sense that the Papacy wanted to 
support the Confederacy. 
On December 3, Pope Pius IX replied to Jefferson Davis directly. In his letter, the Pope 
thanked President Davis for sending his envoys and for his response to the Pope’s letter to the 
Archbishops of New York and New Orleans. In summarizing his letter to the American 
archbishops, the Pontiff expressed his own intentions toward the Civil War. “They should 
employ their most earnest efforts, in our name also, in order that the fatal civil war which is 
arisen in the States should end, and that the people of America made again enjoy mutual peace 
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and concord, and love each other with mutual charity.”77 Noting his own desire for peace, the 
Pope acknowledged and praised President Davis’s desires as expressed in the president’s letter to 
the Pope: “it has been very gratifying to us to recognize, Illustrious and Honorable Sir, that you 
and your people are animated by the same desire for peace and tranquility which we had so 
earnestly inculcated in our aforesaid letters to the Venerable Brethren above named.”78 In 
reference to the North, the Pope wrote, “Oh, that the other people also of the States and their 
rulers, considering seriously how cruel and how deplorable is this intestine war, would receive 
and embrace the council of peace and tranquility.”79 Pius concluded by promising Davis his 
continued prayers for peace and saying that he also prays “to the same most merciful Lord that 
He will illumine Your Excellency with the light His divine grace and unite you with ourselves 
perfect charity.”80 The letter did acknowledge a Confederate desire for peace and, by its request 
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for the Union to embrace peace, it suggested that the North lacked such a desire. The Pope held a 
unique political position in writing his letter; he could empathize with the Confederacy. Pope 
Pius was, like the Confederacy, embroiled in a conflict that sought to unite a nation by seizing 
his country. Further, the United States, like the Italian Kingdom, was seen as a force of 
liberalism, trying to impose liberal abolitionism upon the South, as the Confederacy argued, 
whereas the Italians sought to impose liberal democracy and constitutionalism. Despite sympathy 
the Pope expressed, the letter took no direct side in the war other than a wish for its peaceful end, 
albeit in a manner sympathetic to the Confederacy. 
It was not the content of the letter, however, that drew the attention of millions but its 
salutation. Pope Pius IX addressed his letter “to the Illustrious and Honorable Jefferson Davis, 
President of the Confederate States of America.”81 By calling Davis the “President,” A. Dudley 
Mann immediately concluded that the letter served as a formal recognition of the Confederacy. If 
Jefferson Davis’s title of President of the Confederate States of America was recognized as 
legitimate, then the body that presented Davis with that title, the Confederacy itself, must 
therefore be legitimate too. If a nation refused to recognize the independence of the Confederacy, 
meaning that the Confederate government was itself illegitimate, then its president would, in 
effect, be the president of nothing, legally speaking. Therefore, it could be argued that to 
recognize the legitimacy of Jefferson Davis as a President would, by extension, recognize the 
government over which he presided. As such, Mann wrote Davis that “this letter will grace the 
archives of the Executive Office in all coming time. It will live, too, forever in [hi]story as the 
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production of the first Potentate who formally recognized your official position and accorded to 
one of the diplomatic representatives of the Confederate States an audience in an established 
Court Palace.”82 
Mann, however, was known to exaggerate even the smallest trivialities.83 Confederate 
Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin (see Figure 8) viewed the salutation differently. He noted 
that “this phrase of [Pius IX’s] letter shows that his address to the President as ‘President of the 
Confederate States’ is a formula of politeness to his correspondent, not a political recognition of 
a fact.”84 Nevertheless, in 1864, the Confederacy sent the Bishop of Charleston, Patrick N. 
Lynch (see Figure 9), to Rome to represent the Confederacy. The United States, closely watching 
the situation, demanded assurances that the acceptance of Bishop Lynch would not be a sign of 
the Papacy’s recognition of Confederate independence. Cardinal Giacomo Antonelli then 
comforted the United States by insisting that Bishop Lynch would only be received as a Catholic 
Bishop, not as a Confederate diplomat.85 
While the Pope’s letter expressed sympathy towards the Confederacy, that expression 
never resulted in serious action. The Pope’s intentions toward both sides of the Civil War were 
far more complex than simply disliking the Union and showing sympathy for the Confederacy. 
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While the animosity and compassion did exist and guide the Papacy’s diplomacy in many 
respects, larger geopolitical strategies blunted the impact of Pope Pius’s emotion. As such,  
 
Figure 8: Confederate Secretary of State Judah Benjamin86 (left); and Figure 9: Confederate 
Representative to the Papal States Bishop Patrick Lynch of Charleston87 (right) 
Southern sympathies in the Vatican did not bring substantive support. Northern victories, 
particularly the fall of New Orleans, began to shift Papal opinion towards an inevitable American 
reunification. Furthermore, for the Papacy, the offenses of the United States with the 
Risorgimento were minor relative to larger geopolitical threats. Cardinal Antonelli made the 
Papacy’s desires known in 1862, saying that the United States “should in some way cripple 
England.”88 England had, since the reign of King Henry VIII, been a strong rival to Papal 
influence in Europe. As such, a united and strong United States would be a valuable 
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counterweight to British power.89 Both Pius IX and Cardinal Antonelli believed that the British 
sought to undermine the Pope’s secular control over the Papal States.90 As such, the Pope’s view 
of the United States was paradoxical. The Papacy disliked America in part because of its 
closeness to Italy and, on the other hand, the Papacy tolerated America as a counterweight to 
Britain. Pope Pius IX, therefore, could see value in whoever won the Civil War. 
The internal conflict in the Pope’s view of the Civil War, sympathy towards the 
Confederacy and begrudging tolerance of the Union, actually served the Papacy’s ultimate 
strategic interests. Maintaining amicable relations with both sides of the American Civil War was 
a necessity if the Papacy was to fill its desired role: mediator. The Pope saw Great Britain, which 
controlled Canada, and France, which recently invaded Mexico, as too close to the combatants to 
provide unbiased mediation, as well as too powerful and wanting to see a weaker America. As 
such, a neutral smaller European power, such as the Papal States, could mediate more 
effectively.91 In addition to genuine Christian morality, the pleas for peace that the Pope issued 
served as a request to cease combat so that a mediator could end the political dispute without 
more bloodshed. This desire is reiterated in the reports originating in the London press, 
previously discussed, in which Confederate envoys asked for papal mediation; Pope Pius’s 
response was wholly positive, albeit pointless without Union cooperation.92 For Pius IX, 
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mediating the American conflict could greatly help his position on the Italian Peninsula. 
Understanding both parties through his own participation in governing a country, Pius hoped to 
show that a secular state ruled by the Pope could provide a beneficial service to the international 
community. If so, then there would have been an increased possibility for him to overcome the 
threat of Italian unification though greater international support. 
The Papacy, therefore, interacted with the parties of the Civil War in a complex manner. 
Sympathy towards the Confederacy and animosity towards the Union drove the Pope to 
personally write a sympathetic letter to Jefferson Davis. That letter, however, never amounted to 
the recognition some desired; the Pontiff was unwilling to sever its links with the Union despite 
the tension. In the context of the Italian Unification, the Pope could further the survival of his 
secular rule by gaining the confidence of both sides and helping to negotiate peace between 
them. The Union’s refusal to negotiate an end of the war, however, rendered the Pope’s goals 
unattainable. The sympathy the Pope showed towards the Confederacy never amounted to full 
recognition, concrete actions, or even open support. 
Although not amounting to actual recognition, the ambiguity of the Pope’s letter 
presented the Confederacy with the opportunity to behave as though the letter was an expression 
of recognition. The Confederates nevertheless failed to convince the ultramontane factions of 
France and other Catholic European nations to militarily aid or even just recognize the 
Confederacy. Catholic German and Irish immigrants as well as Irishmen in Ireland, in contrast, 
did prove to be susceptible to the Confederacy’s use of the letter when foreign governments were 
not. As such, the Confederacy, through the manipulation of the Pope’s letter, made several 
efforts to reduce the enlistment of Catholic immigrants both in America and in Ireland. These 
actions began in the pro-recognition interpretations of the Pope’s letter made by Confederate 
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newspapermen and quickly gained governmental participation in the actions of the Confederate 
agent in Ireland. 
Not only did the largely positive position of Catholicism in the antebellum and wartime 
South enable the Confederacy to approach the Papal States diplomatically, it also found 
expressions in how the people reacted to that relationship. The Confederate press not only 
actively accepted their government’s relationship with the Catholic Church, they praised the 
relationship, particularly the letter Pope Pius IX wrote to Jefferson Davis. For example, although 
noting dissention, a correspondent of the Times-Picayune in occupied New Orleans, the center of 
Southern Catholicism, noted that “one of our journals asserts that the address, ‘Illustrious and 
Honorable President,’ is a virtual acknowledgement by that distinguished personage of the 
‘Independence of the Southern Confederacy.’”93 The praise for the content of the letter was even 
extended to the quality of the Pope’s writing skills. While publishing the widespread Southern 
translation of the letter, the Way of the World of Greensboro, North Carolina, added to the 
standard introduction a praise of the letter as “something so high-toned, so noble and 
characteristic” in the quality of the letter beyond simply its content.94 The Richmond Dispatch 
went even further, describing the letter as “a masterpiece of composition, one of the very 
happiest efforts of a pen which ‘touches nothing that it does not adorn.’”95 
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As a result of the Pope’s supposedly pro-Confederate position, the Southern press 
fiercely defended the Pontiff. The Washington Chronicle, edited by John W. Forney, a close 
friend of President Lincoln, issued one attack that several Confederate papers felt needed 
repudiation. In the pro-Union article, Forney’s paper argued that the tone of the Pope’s writing 
will find no sympathy among “loyal Americans,” particularly noting that the Pope’s expression 
that the North would come to desire peace as insinuating that the Northern population is 
composed of warmongers, in addition to the letter’s pro-Southern statements.96 Decrying the 
“harsh terms” expressed about the Pope’s letter, one Confederate paper attacked the Chronicle 
saying, “The Chronicle is Lincoln’s dirt-thrower, and Forney is his lick-spittle, and yet Forney 
was once supposed to be a white man, and tolerably decent.”97 
Several other newspapers wrote lengthy articles analyzing why the letter was written and 
what it meant. Perhaps, given the smaller Catholic population, the Southern press felt a greater 
need to explain why the Confederacy chose to engage diplomatically with the Papal States. One 
article written to explain why a relationship with the Pope was sought systematically explained 
the role of the Pope in diplomacy. It noted the prevalence of Catholicism in Europe and 
elsewhere. It further showed how, in the hierarchical Catholic Church, the words of the Pope 
would be held in higher regard than those of pro-Union clerics such as Archbishop Hughes of 
New York. With those arguments made, the newspaper revealed how they would dissuade 
Catholic immigrants from enlisting in the Union’s armies.98 
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The Confederate press even took steps to exaggerate that relationship by claiming that the 
letter was a formal recognition, although it was not. Although some of this mischaracterization 
could have been a result of ignorance, for some it was undoubtedly intentional. While the lack of 
a formal and explicit recognition would blunt the impact of the Pope’s words to diplomatic 
audiences, outright exaggerations could be unhesitantly accepted by those with little care for 
formality or the resources to question the documents: the Irish and German Catholic immigrants 
in the North and in Ireland. The Confederate press was certainly aware that a pro-Confederate 
interpretation of the letters would have a deterring effect on the Union enlistment of Catholics. 
One Southern Catholic more than any other took full advantage of treating the Pope’s 
letter as though it constituted recognition: Father John Bannon of St. Louis, Missouri (see Figure 
10). After serving as a Confederate chaplain in the besieged port of Vicksburg, Father Bannon 
was sent to Ireland to attempt to curtail Union recruitment there, as previously discussed. With 
the approval of Archbishop Sean Cullen of Dublin, Father Bannon hung bills in Dublin churches 
and sent letters to the country parishes in which he emphatically defended Southern nationalism 
and decried what he described as Northern mistreatment of Catholics and their use of Irishmen as 
cannon fodder.99  Although no nation recognized the Confederacy as a result of the actions of 
Pope Pius IX, especially as the Pope failed to explicitly and unambiguously recognize the 
Confederacy, Father Bannon was able to make the argument that the Pope had extended support 
and recognition widespread in Ireland. A Catholic newspaper in Cincinnati, the Cincinnati 
Catholic Telegraph, was actually confronted with a handbill from Ireland that presented the 
letters between the Pope and Jefferson Davis and claimed Pope Pius’s support and advocacy for  
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Figure 10: Antebellum image of Father John Bannon of St. Louis100 
the Confederacy. The handbill was signed under the pseudonym “Sacredos,” Latin for “priest.” 
The Cincinnati newspaper immediately identified it as the work of the Confederate agent in 
Ireland, Father Bannon.101 This handbill was likely Father Bannon’s most forceful work, his 
“Address to the Catholic Clergy and People of Ireland.” In it, the Confederate priest potently 
argued that “As a priest of the Catholic Church, I am anxious to see the desires of the Holy 
Father realized speedily, and therefore have taken this means [the poster] to lay before you the 
expression of his sentiments on the subject of the American War, knowing that no Catholic will 
persevere in the advocacy of an aggression condemned by his Holiness.”102 In arguing so, Father 
Bannon manipulated Pope Pius’s condemnation of the war into a Pontifically-ordained duty for 
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all Catholics to avoid the war, which meant in the circumstances in Ireland the avoidance of 
Union recruiters. 
While Father Bannon made many forceful arguments against Irish enlistment, a pro-
recognition interpretation of the Pope’s letter to President Davis was widely used in dissuading 
Irish recruitment. The Pope’s letter, along with Father Bannon’s larger efforts and a pro-
Confederate article in Irish newspapers by exiled Irish nationalist John Mitchell, were singled out 
in a New York Times foreign correspondent’s article as among the principle means dissuading 
Irishmen from entering the war;103 a similar understanding of relative importance is noted in the 
London Times while assessing Irish placards.104 Furthermore, the prominence of this argument is 
noted by the fact that the handbills printed and distributed in Ireland could even be found in the 
Union, as noted in the aforementioned Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph article.105 Beyond the 
Confederate interpretations of the Pope’s letter that were presented to the Irish people, several 
Irish newspapers themselves engaged in the debate by providing the letters free of interpretation 
for Irish readers. On January 3, 1864, the Irish Times of Dublin published, without interpretation 
or analysis, the text of Jefferson Davis’s letter to Pope Pius IX and the Pope’s response.106 On 
January 9, 1864, the Irish People, also of Dublin, followed suit publishing the same.107 The 
letters themselves were taken from the Parisian newspaper La France which published French 
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translations of both Jefferson Davis’s letter originally written in English and Pope Pius’s letter 
originally written in Latin; the Irish newspapers used a widely transmitted English translation of 
the French translation, albeit keeping to British spelling conventions. 
The attempts by Catholic clerics such as Father Bannon and Bishop Lynch to lessen Irish 
enlistment in the Union Army and increase Irish enlistment in the Confederate Army shows that 
that the Confederacy believed that many Catholic immigrants or would-be immigrants would 
hold the ultimately inaccurate opinions of the clergy in high enough regard to influence their 
decisions to enlist. If this belief was as true and as universal as the Confederacy’s desires, a 
Papal declaration of recognition and support for the Confederacy had a significant potential in 
actually influencing the military course of the war by hurting Union recruitment. While there are 
some indications that Irish immigrants and German Catholic immigrants enlisted at 
disproportionately lower levels,108 demonstrating why some Catholic groups enlisted in fewer 
numbers is impossible. It is also difficult to argue that all Catholic groups enlisted at lower rates 
than Protestants. While many Catholics undoubtedly chose not to enlist on the basis of the 
Confederate interpretations of the Pope’s letter, it is impossible to enumerate how many Catholic 
Northerners who did not fight in the Civil War chose not to do so as a result of this one 
motivation, either alone or in association with other motivations. In Ireland, while Father Bannon 
did not end Irish immigration to the North, Confederate diplomats in London believed, although 
the figures were certainly inflated, that the priest may have cut Irish recruitment by the Union by 
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as much as two-thirds.109 The claims of the Confederate agents are, like the numbers regarding 
American enlistment, difficult to verify. It is impossible to count how many Irishmen considered 
immigrating to the North then later changed their mind as a result of this one argument. The 
exaggerations of the Confederate agents do, though, reveal that to some extent Father Bannon’s 
arguments did have some success, albeit unmeasurable. Although diplomatic efforts failed in 
Catholic Europe, the Pope’s letter to Jefferson Davis, even though it did not actually constitute 
recognition, did have some implications on the Civil War by causing some Catholics not to enlist 
as a result of the misrepresentation of the views of Pope Pius IX. While several newspapers in 
the United States and the British Isles corroborated the influence of Father Bannon’s use of the 
letter, unfortunately little evidence has survived to definitively state or disprove the exact degree 
of influence that the Papacy’s alleged sentiments had on Catholic enlistment. The influence of 
both those in America who chose not to enlist and those in Ireland who decided not to come as a 
result of the letter was likely very small. 
The reaction of Northern Catholics to the Confederate allegations regarding the Pope’s 
letter, at least the reaction of those Catholics of a high enough profile to have their sentiments 
preserved in the Northern press, stand in sharp contrast to the Confederacy. Those surviving 
Catholic voices are those of the editors and writers of Catholic newspapers, people who spoke 
directly to the Catholic communities and, to a certain extent, for those communities. Given their 
positions as newspapermen, they publicly spoke in manners far more politically engaged than 
that of Catholic prelates who often self-censured their words and kept their politics private. For 
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their efforts, Catholic newspaper articles on the topic of Papal recognition in particular were 
widely syndicated in non-Catholic newspapers across the North. As such, these newspaper 
writers were portrayed in the Union as a representative voice of Catholics. 
The Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph, a voice for Northern Catholics, had several articles 
that had been widely syndicated in non-Catholic newspapers. One noteworthy syndicated article 
was the aforementioned article written in response to claims made by Father Bannon in a 
handbill written on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean that was presented to the newspaper. The 
Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph responded combatively, accusing the Southern agent of lying 
about Papal support for the Confederacy in order to provoke an anti-Catholic backlash in the 
North. With that reasoning, Father Bannon and other Catholics touting the Pope’s letter as 
recognition were accused of placing the Confederacy above the good of the Catholic Church, 
“The gratification of their political prejudices and the preservation of slavery, with all its vile 
associations, appear to be nearer the hearts of some men than the diffusion of the Church or the 
preservation of what she has already acquired.”110 The article was reported in other newspapers, 
such as in the Civilian and Telegraph of Cumberland, Maryland, under the title “Catholic 
Opinion of a Copperhead Lie.”111 
Elsewhere, the Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph reacted defensively. When confronted with 
the accusation that the Pope recognized the Confederacy, the Northern Catholic newspapermen 
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chose to defend the Pope and, by extension, all Catholics in the Union by emphatically 
dismissing the pro-recognition interpretation of the letter. “The correspondence between Mr. 
Jefferson Davis and Pope Pius has been published. The Pope, like everyone else, is anxious for 
peace, but is no advocate of rebellion at home or abroad. WE KNOW WHAT WE STATE TO 
BE TRUE.”112 Emphatic in their defense, they wisely noted Pope Pius’s own fear of Italian pro-
unification rebellions in central Italy. Their defense was used as a pseudo-official American 
Catholic response to the controversial Papal letter, being widely syndicated across the North.113 
Syndication, however, does not necessarily mean inserting articles without commentary. 
The Ashtabula Weekly Telegraph of Ashtabula, Ohio, for example, prefaced its syndication 
noting how pro-Confederate Northern newspapers saw the Pope’s words as expressing a 
sympathetic attitude toward the Confederacy. The Ohio newspaper then used the Cincinnati 
Catholic Telegraph’s article as an authoritative refutation of that interpretation.114 The Lewisburg 
Chronicle of Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, stated that the Catholic newspaper’s article would be of 
little comfort to Confederates and Northern Copperheads, likewise seeing authority in the words 
of the Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph. Then the Pennsylvania newspaper listed several Northern 
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Catholics devoted to the Union – Orestes Brownson, General William Rosecrans, and General 
Thomas Meagher. In doing so, the Lewisburg Chronicle defended Catholics by noting their 
contributions to the Union and expresses the hope that all Catholics would heed the writings of 
the Cincinnati Catholic Telegraph and be like those named Catholic defenders of the United 
States.115 
The letter of Pope Pius IX, however, could not be restricted only to its intended Irish and 
American Catholic audiences. As such, the letter and its mere suggestion that it was possible that 
the Papacy could have recognized the Confederate States entered the wider American media. 
There, the letter itself and the arguments it initiated gained significant attention in both the North 
and the South. The earliest reports of the letter appeared in the United States on January 14, 
1864, with the simple syndicated foreign news report stating, “The La France publishes the 
recent correspondence between Jeff. Davis and the Pope. The latter addresses Davis as an 
"illustrious president" and expresses much friendliness.”116 This statement was widely reported 
throughout both the North and the South. The next day several newspapers published the full text 
of the letters from La France.117 Albeit distinguished from the Irish newspapers by the lack of 
British spelling conventions, the letters maintained the same translations from English and Latin 
to English through French. This translation was widespread in the Northern press through 
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repeated syndications. Starting ten days later on January 25, separate translations of the letters 
appeared and were widely syndicated in the Southern press, with the addition of the Pope’s letter 
to the archbishops, with the Pope’s letter translated directly from the Latin, and with Jefferson 
Davis’s English-language letter left unaltered.118 
Although the translations differed in some words and sentence structures, the translations 
were remarkably similar in content, especially as the Northern translation entered the English 
language indirectly. The most significant translation issue occurred when the letter was 
translated from Latin to French for La France. While the letter is indisputably addressed “To the 
Illustrious and Honorable Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States of America,” that 
phrase is not repeated in the text of the letter itself. Rather, the Latin phrase used the three times 
in the letter when Pope Pius references Davis is “illustre et honorabili viro;” French newspapers 
translated incorrectly into French as “illustre et honorable president.” Directly translated from 
Latin as man, in this context viro would best be rendered as sir, making the proper address as 
“illustrious and honorable sir.” While the French translation of the phrase is not necessarily 
inaccurate in context, although certainly not literal, it reinforces the notion three additional times 
that the Pope referred to Jefferson Davis as a president. Further, as the Southern press, using a 
direct translation, used sir rather than president, the stressing of the Pope’s use of Davis’s title 
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was only present regionally in the North.119 Although it cannot be verified beyond contemporary 
speculation, the New York Times Parisian correspondent labeled La France a secessionist 
newspaper and suggested that the letters reached the French newspaper from Confederate agents. 
As the translation error in the letters occurred during the translation from Latin to French, that 
error occurred as a result of the actions of either the French editors, who were accused of being 
pro-Confederate, or the alledged Confederate distributers. If the characterizations or suggestions 
of the New York Times are accurate, it can be insinuated that the letters were intentionally 
translated to add emphasis to Pope Pius using Jefferson Davis’s title. 120 
The emphasis added by repeatedly calling Jefferson Davis president, as found in the 
translation of the letter through the La France article distributed through the Northern press, 
likely contributed to increased speculation in the North that the Pope’s letter constituted actual 
recognition. The pro-recognition interpretation of the letter was further fueled by its convenient 
blending of two major Northern ideologies: hatred of the Confederacy and hatred of the Catholic 
Church.121 As such, the Northern press often began to read the Pope’s letter and wishfully saw in 
it a hint of Papal support for the South, ranging from formal recognition to mere sympathy. The 
ambiguity of the letter, however, made arguments for its intent as recognition difficult to 
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effectively argue. Some, therefore, made the argument subtly; the Cincinnati Enquirer, for 
example, simply presented the letters without analysis or explanation yet under the heading, 
“Recognition of the Confederate Government by the Pope in Rome – Important 
Correspondence.”122 The Daily Kansas Tribune attempted to formulate a well-reasoned 
argument to condemn the Pope. By arguments of analogy, the Kansas newspaper condemned 
Jefferson Davis as Satanic; Pope Pius, in contrast, as a man of religion was expected to behave 
like Christ. In one analogy, Jefferson Davis’s letter to the Pontiff, being vile lies in the opinion of 
the Union newspaper, was akin to Satan’s temptation of Christ in the desert. While excusing the 
Pope for his lack of divine omniscience, Pope Pius is nonetheless contrasted with Christ for 
believing and expressing sympathy for the Satanic Confederate.123 
Others derided the Pope for his inability to effectively act on behalf of the Confederacy 
regardless of even the formal granting of recognition. The Burlington Weekly Free Press of 
Vermont stated that, “We think Jeff. must be a little ‘cracked’ if he attaches any value to the 
service of Pope Pius IX.”124 Harper’s Weekly provided an illustration to express this sentiment 
(see Figure 11). Entitled “Cold Comfort,” the cartoon depicts Jefferson Davis holding the Pope’s 
letter while shivering in ragged clothing. As such, it vividly showed that kind and sympathetic 
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words, even with the use of formal title, means nothing to a people lacking the basic necessities 
of clothing and food.125 
 
Figure 11: Cartoon appearing in Harper’s Weekly, January 30, 1864126 
Some in the North, however, made arguments defending the Pope. Entitled “Pope Pius 
for the Union,” one widely syndicated article condemned the letter as a forgery by contradicting 
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Pope Pius’s alleged sympathy for the South. Researching in the letters the State Department 
submits annually to Congress, the author found and quoted a letter sent the previous April by the 
American Minister in Rome, Richard Blatchford, to Secretary of State Seward. In it, Blatchford 
relayed that Pope Pius and Cardinal Antonelli “are decided friends of the Union, and ardently 
desire that its integrity may be preserved,” noting that Cardinal Antonelli in particular was 
especially hopeful of a Union victory.127 While the assessment was made by Blatchford from his 
discussions with the Cardinal Secretary of State,128 the author was wrong in assuming that it 
must have rendered the Pope’s letter a forgery. The author ultimately failed to take into account 
the increasingly complex and even paradoxical diplomatic position in which the Papacy found 
itself. 
Unfortunately for the Pope’s defenders in the broader Northern press, the writer of “Pope 
Pius for the Union” was not alone in being hampered by factual error when defending Pope Pius. 
A writer in the Cleveland Daily Leader accepted the Pope’s letter but chose to read into its words 
a tone of sarcasm. The author cited one line from the letter in particular, when he says the Pope 
asks Jefferson Davis “to exert himself to bring about the end of the fatal civil war in order that 
the people may obtain peace and concord and dwell charitably together.” The author suggested 
that for Davis to adhere best to this command, the Confederate would need to withdraw from the 
war and flee to the Pope’s side in Rome.129 The issue, though, was that the author had taken the 
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quote out of its context. Rather than asking Jefferson Davis to do all he could for peace, Pope 
Pius was simply summarizing the request he had previously made to archbishops of New York 
and New Orleans; the Pontiff has asked them, not Davis, to act in favor of peace. The Pope, in 
contrast, had accepted Davis’s words that the president already truly desired peace. 
One constant appeared in the Union press about the letter Pope Pius IX wrote to Jefferson 
Davis: the lack of a consensus on the meaning of the letter. Throughout the North, newspapers 
saw the words of the Pope and reacted differently. Some saw the letter as formal recognition; 
those who saw that in the North condemned Pope Pius for it. Others acknowledged the sympathy 
but viewed it as irrelevant or worthless to the Civil War. Some fought the accusations of 
recognition, with the Northern Catholic newspapermen notably doing so more accurately than 
the non-Catholic newspapermen. All these varying newspaper articles provide a glimpse into 
how the Northerners looked upon the Papal-Confederate relationship. In contrast, the South saw 
what they wanted to see: recognition. Rather than arguments over meaning, the South uniformly 
looked to the Pope’s words as that of a friend. As such, in the North and South, this particular 
relationship was not left only to politicians and civil servants; rather, it became a public debate 
on the meaning of words. After the war, that discussion would remain enlivened for half a 
century and become a conversation on the place of Catholicism in America. During the war 
itself, however, the relationship did not bear the fruits that the Confederacy had hoped. No nation 
acted diplomatically as even the Papacy backtracked. Catholics in America did enlist in lower 
numbers, possibly as a result of this diplomatic conversion, as did Catholics in Ireland, almost 
certainly in part as a result of this diplomatic conversion. The lower Catholic enlistment, 
however, was ultimately not low enough to alter the course of the American Civil War. 
67 
 
The role of the Papacy in the Civil War was very complex and often wishfully or 
intentionally misunderstood. Pope Pius IX did write a letter to Jefferson Davis that was 
sympathetic to the Confederate cause and did address Davis by his title. The Pope, however, 
would go no farther and never recognized the Confederate States of America. Rather, the Papal 
States and the Confederacy had different expectations of each other; the Union, in contrast, 
simply acted with disregard towards the Papacy, seeing it only as a weak government surrounded 
by the Union’s Italian ally. For the Pontiff, he could relate more easily to the Confederacy yet 
did not have the freedom to forsake his relationship with the Union, fearing the British as a 
greater threat and seeing America as increasingly winning the war. With pro-unification Italians 
surrounding Rome, he hoped that he could justify his political Pontificate by mediating a 
solution to the Civil War. To do so, the Pope needed amicable relations with the North and the 
South, a further reason for his refusal to sever ties with the Union and his reaching out to 
Jefferson Davis. The Confederacy, in contrast, wanted to use the Pope’s support to rally Catholic 
Europe, in particular the French Imperial Army in Mexico, to its cause. Another goal was using 
the Pope’s support to dissuade Catholics from joining the Union Army. The former failed when 
no recognition came, but the Confederacy was able to use its press and its agents overseas to 
foster the exaggerated narrative that recognition had come in order to dissuade Union enlistment. 
To that end, the Confederacy succeeded in dissuading some, but not nearly enough to change the 
outcome of the Civil War. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POSTWAR LEGACY OF WARTIME DIPLOMACY 
The conclusion of the war ended with a decisive Union victory. That neither severed the 
complex relationship between the Papacy and the former Confederacy nor ended its legacy. The 
longest-lived legacy of the Papal-Confederate relationship was in its recollection by the 
American people. Many distorted the meaning of the Pope Pius IX’s letter to Jefferson Davis 
while some defended the Pontiff. Some did so to support their anti-Catholic motivations. The 
efforts the Papacy would offer toward several former Confederates contributed to this use of the 
distortion of the interchange. 
The most notable expressions of the postwar relationship between the Papacy and the 
former members of the Confederacy occurred in 1866. Pius IX sent Jefferson Davis an 
autographed photo of himself while Davis was imprisoned after the war. On the photo, the Pope 
offered the former Confederate the words of Christ that the oppressed should turn to God and 
that he would give them rest, handwriting in Latin Matthew 11:28, “Venite ad me omnes qui 
laboratis, et ego reficiam vos, dicit Dominus.”130 Davis would later express empathy towards 
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Pius, seeing the Pope and himself in similar circumstances, “the one ‘the prisoner of the 
Vatican,’ the other the prisoner of Reconstruction.”131 
In addition, the Church became involved in the aftermath of the Lincoln assassination. 
John H. Surratt, a Catholic accused with his mother and several friends of conspiring to kidnap 
and assassinate President Lincoln, was pursued by Union forces in the aftermath of President 
Lincoln’s assassination. Rather than being captured, tried, and hung like his mother, Mary 
Surratt, John Surratt managed to escape with the aid of the Catholic Church. He was smuggled to 
Rome where he ultimately served Pope Pius in the Papal Zouaves (see Figure 12, John Surratt in 
his Papal Zouaves uniform). American pressure later resulted in his flight from Rome and 
eventual seizure and deportation to the United States. While the Papacy did not save him from an 
American trial, it delayed it. As the sentiment of the American public was decidedly different 
when John Surratt was finally tried, Surratt was eventually freed without a conviction.132 In one 
sense, by delaying his trial until a more favorable time, the Catholic Church ultimately saved 
John Surratt’s life. While the Pope’s actions toward Jefferson Davis certainly showed personal 
affinity between the two figures, the acceptance of John Surratt into the Papal military fostered 
the belief that the Pope’s sympathy was more widespread among former Confederates than just 
toward the Confederate President. 
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Figure 12: John Surratt133 in his Papal Zouave uniform 
In 1867, American politicians finally chose to act on the alleged Papal support for the 
Confederacy, both during the war and afterward. The American Civil War ended in 1865, but the 
struggles of the Risorgimento continued, enabling a victorious United States to decide how to 
treat Pope Pius as part of America’s postwar diplomacy. With the war over, the United States 
began to take a harder approach towards the Papal States. One event brought the American-Papal 
tension to a head. In 1867, Congress actively sought to sever political relations with the Pope. 
Protestantism, being illegal for locals in the Papal States, was practiced in the embassies and 
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consulates in Rome. For the United States, the Minister’s house served as the location of 
religious services for those American Protestants visiting Rome. While the Anglican Church and 
the Scottish Presbyterian Church were ordered to meet only outside the ancient walls of Rome in 
1867, the American Protestant Church moved its location for an entirely different reason – 
Protestant visitors became too numerous for the Minster’s house. As such, the Minister rented an 
additional building to facilitate worship. Congress, claiming that the Papacy forced the American 
Protestant Church to leave the walled city, closed the American Legation in Rome, despite the 
Minister’s repeated efforts to correct the false information. Congress’s insistence on closing the 
American Legation, and thereby ending any diplomatic relationship with the Papacy, was based 
on several factors, most notably the United States’ strong support for the Italian Kingdom which 
sought Rome as its capital. Removing the Legation was therefore a preparation for the 
anticipated move of the American embassy to Rome once the Risorgimento was complete.134 
There was, however, an underlying factor. Part of Congress’s anger at Pope Pius was rooted in 
his wartime actions or at least what people thought he has done during the war. Harper’s Weekly 
expressed this sentiment in a February, 1867 article: “As it was the only Government in the 
world to recognize the Southern Confederacy, so now the Papal Government is the only one 
which denies the right of worship to American Protestants in Rome.”135 
The shutting of the American Legation in Rome was the only political action taken 
against Pope Pius IX. In 1870, events changed in such a way that made American retaliation 
against the Papacy moot. A Prussian invasion of France forced Emperor Napoleon III to 
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withdraw the French forces protecting the Pope in Rome, partly for the need of the soldiers and 
partly to appease the Kingdom of Italy to convince them not to ally with Prussia. With the recall 
of the French army, Italian troops were able to seize Rome on September 20, 1870; from that 
point until a final treaty in 1929, Pope Pius was effectively a prisoner within the walled Vatican 
City. As such, political relations between the United States and the temporal powers of the 
Papacy ceased to exist, and would not resume until President Reagan reestablished relations in 
1984.136 
The end of diplomacy did not mean an end to the discussion, though. For a half century 
after the American Civil War, newspapers regularly discussed one aspect of the wartime 
relationship: the letter that Pope Pius IX wrote Confederate President Jefferson Davis. It should 
be noted that the discussions did not appear perpetually; rather, newspapers reiterated their 
discussions of the letters in waves. The mid-1870s, the late 1880s, the early 1890s, and the late 
1890s stand out as periods when the controversy over the meaning of the letter was most 
frequently discussed. The precise timing of the individual waves was mostly driven by individual 
newspapermen and Protestant ministers as part of the local discussions on the place of 
Catholicism that were syndicated across the nation. 
The waves collectively, however, began in the context of growing anti-Catholicism in the 
United States. In 1875, around the time of the first post-war discussions of Pope Pius IX’s letter, 
President Grant delivered a speech, first to a reunion of the Army of the Tennessee and then to 
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join session of Congress. Grant’s proposal was that states should be compelled to provide public 
education and that that education should be free of all religious influence.137 In the weeks 
afterward, Congressmen James G. Blaine of Maine proposed a constitutional amendment to that 
effect, mandating that states provide no taxpayer money to any religious institution, particular 
schools.138 The Catholic Church had, in the United States, established countless schools for the 
education of Catholics, particularly but not exclusively because of the use of the Protestant Bible 
in public schools. In several states where Catholics held political influence, these schools 
operated with government funding. The increases in Catholic immigration into the United States, 
particularly from Southern and Eastern Europe, caused many to fear growing Catholic influence 
as their increasing numbers gave them increasingly greater political power, particularly as 
Catholic schools produced educated Catholics outside the control of the Protestant establishment. 
Congressmen Blaine tried to capitalize politically on these anti-Catholic fears by proposing a 
constitutional amendment that both gave the appearance of promoting religious liberty and 
played to the anti-Catholic sentiments of the electorate.139 
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While his amendment ultimately failed, as did his aspirations for the presidency, the 
Blaine Amendment brought the issue of Catholicism in America into the open. Nativism had 
returned, as organizations such as the Order of American Union, the Alpha Association, and the 
American Protective Association were formed to combat Catholicism in America. It was in this 
backdrop of anti-Catholic public opinion, specifically starting around the time of the Blaine 
Amendment, that the Confederate argument that the Pope’s letter recognized the Confederacy’s 
sovereignty was revived. In the political climate at the time, the argument held a different 
meaning – Catholics, as a result of their adherence to an allegedly pro-Confederate Pope, were 
inherently disloyal to the United States. 
That argument against Catholicism was aided by Pope Pius’s postwar actions. The events 
surrounding the flight of John Surratt, supported by the photograph sent to Jefferson Davis by 
Pope Pius IX, built on claims of Papal sympathy and recognition and led anti-Catholics to 
conjure wild conspiracy theories. Most notably, a former Catholic priest who converted to 
Presbyterianism, Charles Chiniquy, openly argued in 1886 that the Catholic Society of Jesus, 
also known as the Jesuits, conspired with the Surratt family and the other assassins to murder 
Abraham Lincoln. He went as far as to call John Wilkes Booth a “tool of the priests.”140 
Chiniquy was able to justify his conspiracy view to the American people by his personal 
relationship with Lincoln, although exaggerated; in 1855, Lincoln represented Chiniquy as a 
lawyer in a minor court case.141 The ultimate justification, though, was an examination of both 
                                                 
140 Charles Chiniquy, Fifty Years in the Church of Rome: The life story of Pastor 
Chiniquy, who was for twenty-five years a priest in the Roman Catholic Church (New York: 
Fleming H. Revell Company, 1886), 711-736. 
141 Chiniquy, Fifty Years in the Church of Rome, 617-629. 
75 
 
the actual and exaggerated relationship between Pope Pius IX and the Confederacy.142 This 
justification was repeated as late as 1922 by other anti-Catholic advocates, especially former 
Catholic priests.143 
The assassination conspiracy largely remained a minor argument, though, reserved for 
the most extreme anti-Catholic of advocates. Newspaper articles rarely went as far as Chiniquy 
had in claiming that the Jesuits assassinated Abraham Lincoln. Nevertheless, they still attacked 
Catholics for the alleged watime relationship between the Confederacy and the Papacy. Each of 
the waves of the discussions appearing the press began in a similar manner. There would be a 
public discussion of the letters, most often in the context of a general attack on the loyalty of 
Catholics in America. Then someone, either a newspaperman or another interested party, would 
search for the letters, finding them in the records of the Confederacy confiscated by the Union 
and held at the Department of the Treasury or the Department of War. The resulting published 
letter was then included in an article often entitled as evidence of Papal recognition of the 
Confederacy, albeit without any explanation of how the vague letter was a recognition. 
Although a syndicated article on the topic in 1897 tells that the discussion began 
internally among the American Catholic community,144 most mentions of the claim that the Pope 
recognized the Confederacy began with anti-Catholic writers and speakers. For example, in 
                                                 
142 Chiniquy. Fifty Years in the Church of Rome. 
143 For a further example of the Jesuit assassination conspiracy theory, from 1922, see: 
Burke McCarty, The Suppressed Truth about the Assassination of Abraham Lincoln 
(Washington, DC: Burke McCarty Publisher, 1922). 
144 “Pope Pius to Mr. Davis,” Alexandria Gazette (Alexandria, Va), July 26, 1897. 
76 
 
1875, a syndicated article from the New York Observer told how, upon mentioning the letter in 
the context of a discussion on the loyalty of American Catholics, the newspaper was challenged 
to produce the letter; it did so after finding it among the captured records of the Confederacy.145 
Upon finding the same records the following year, a syndicated article from the New York Times 
was entitled, “How the Pope Recognized the Southern Confederacy: His Letter to Jeff Davis.”146 
Captain Patrick O’Farrell, a Catholic himself, investigated the letter at the War Department and 
published his findings in a syndicated newspaper article upon hearing the claims of Papal 
recognition of the Confederacy mentioned at memorial service at the Metropolitan Methodist 
Episcopal Church in Washington, D.C. by Dr. Luther T. Townsend.147 
In addition to Chiniquy and Townsend, other Protestant preachers also made the claim 
that Pope Pius supported the Confederacy. Reverend John Lee of the First Methodist Episcopal 
Church of Chicago presented the argument in 1894 when discrediting Catholics in a debate on 
public school education, directly tying the argument that the Pope recognized the Confederacy to 
the aftermath of the Blaine Amendment. After arguing that Catholics cannot be entrusted with 
educating children as, he argued, the Jesuits planned and promoted the Civil War, he was 
challenged to provide proof; the Pope’s letter was his evidence.148 While all other anti-Catholic 
writers were certainly aware of the debate over Catholic influence in education, they engaged in 
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the argument indirectly by attacking the Catholic Church generally for disloyalty during the war. 
Lee, in contrast, was acting not simply religiously in challenging Catholicism; he had a defined 
political goal in his presentation of the Pope’s letter, arguing for the separation of Catholicism 
from education. 
White Protestants were not alone in using the Pope’s letter to condemn Catholicism. 
While largely staying out of the debate, at one point a writer in the black community in Utah 
directly addressed the letter: “Even the Pope of Rome pronounced his august blessings upon 
Jefferson Davis in 1863, and his Holiness Pope Pius IX, wished Mr. Davis the greatest success in 
his undertaking. This being true it is no wonder that there still lingers a spirit among the 
professing followers of Jesus that the negro should not be endowed with the right to worship the 
Virgin Mary nor to dip their hands into the holy water with their white brethren.”149 As such, the 
writer argues that the localized bigotry in some Catholic churches was actually systemic, rising 
to the level of bigotry in the Papacy itself, as evidenced by the Pope’s supposedly pro-
Confederate sentiment. 
In these articles, it is important to note that the translation was different than those that 
appeared in the North and the South during the war. The translation used was one produced after 
the war and taken directly from the original Latin. As such, it did not transmit the mistranslation 
of viro as president from the French translation used by La France and did not independently 
repeat that error. The authors of this translation were the officers of the United States Department 
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of the Treasury, the department that maintained the Confederacy’s captured documents.150 As it 
was also the holder of the letter, and as the newspapermen and researchers consistently went to 
them for the letter, the federal government held a significant level of control over how the letter 
was released. One figure who took advantage of this discretion was Albert W. Crites of 
Nebraska, the chief of the Division of Captured and Abandoned Property at the Treasury 
Department. He included A. Dudley Mann’s preface to the letter which was sent, with the letter, 
to Jefferson Davis. In it, Mann viewed the Pope’s letter as official recognition, declaring that 
“this letter will grace the archives of the Executive Office in all coming time. It will live, too, 
forever in [hi]story as the production of the first Potentate who formally recognized your official 
position and accorded to one of the diplomatic representatives of the Confederate States and 
audience in an established court palace, like that of St. James and the Tuileries.”151 As such, the 
newspapers that received Mann’s preface with the requested Papal letter did not receive an 
ambiguous set of writings but rather clear evidence that at least some in the Confederate State 
Department viewed the letter as recognition.152 Crites’s views, however, were not universal 
among federal employees. In 1894 and 1903, the War Department was asked about the letters by 
interested parties. Each time, the War Department refused to pass judgment on the meaning of 
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the Pope’s letter. Rather, they provided the ambiguous letter and, in 1894, suggested pursuing the 
issue further at the State Department.153 
Unlike several Protestant preachers, black newspapermen, and government officials, 
some came to the defense of the Pope and, by extension, American Catholics. W. E. Curtis of the 
Chicago Record systematically and authoritatively sought to dispel the accusations. He noted 
that, the British, French, and Brazilian Empires and the Spanish and Dutch Kingdoms, 
recognized the belligerency of the Confederacy without acknowledging the Confederate claims 
to independence. He further cited Dr. Jose Ignacio Rodriguez, described as a recognized 
authority on diplomatic history. Curtis cited the works of Rodriquez where the historian 
explained the history of the letters and included a copy of them, albeit using the wartime 
translation originating in La France.154 
In 1909, the Catholic Church put forward a compelling response to the accusations. 
Cardinal James Gibbons, the Archbishop of Baltimore and the most powerful Catholic leader in 
the nation, addressed the issue in an article in in the North American Review. In it, he detailed the 
role of Catholicism in the history of the United States and noted the patriotism within the 
American Catholic population.  The issue of the claims of recognition had spread beyond simply 
anti-Catholicism or education: some questioned whether Catholics should even participate in 
government. Those who made the argument feared that had Lincoln been a Catholic, he would 
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have had to recognize the Confederacy once the Pope supposedly did. Cardinal Gibbons 
responded forcefully that “a Catholic President would act, under the circumstances, precisely as 
Abraham Lincoln; he would treat the recognition with a respectful silence, and continue to 
prosecute the war to the best of his ability. If he acted otherwise he would be a traitor to his 
conscience and his God, to his country and to the Constitution which he had sworn to uphold. 
And he would have Catholic theological teaching at his back.”155 
Cardinal Gibbons’ defense of Catholicism from the claims surrounding the Pope’s letter 
notably differed from that of others. Rather than attacking the meaning of the letter like everyone 
before him, Cardinal Gibbons proposed that even if the recognition had happened it would not 
have had any real effect on Catholic Americans. Ultimately, the opponents and supporter of 
Catholicism in the United States, before Cardinal Gibbons, made one significant error: they 
ignored the agency of individual Catholics. They believed that the meaning of the letter 
determined the loyalty of Catholics, holding that Catholics were more politically loyal to the 
Pope than their own country. Those who saw the letter as favoring recognition believed 
Catholics had been disloyal by virtue of the actions of the Roman Pontiff; those who saw the 
letter as a polite gesture argued that Catholics were loyal during the Civil War. In his argument, 
Cardinal Gibbons showed that ideology and morality was far more diverse. While the Pope was 
to be obeyed on moral issues, so were oaths made to the United States before God. As such, the 
choice for a Catholic to fight for the Union or refuse to enlist was far more of a personal choice 
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than many were willing to acknowledge; the words of the Pope, even if they were a formal 
recognition, would impose few if any real obligations upon American Catholics. 
Discussions of the meaning of the letter waned after 1910. There is no clear reason why 
this happened but several possibilities do exist. First, the nature of Cardinal Gibbon’s argument 
rendered the debate about the letter largely irrelevant as he held that a Catholic president would 
act the same regardless of what the Pope said about the Confederacy. Second, the length of time 
since the events themselves made them less relevant to younger generations. In 1923, Leo 
Francis Stock, a young professor at the Catholic University of America, analyzed the letters and 
events surrounding them.156 This marked an important milestone as it shows that the discussions 
became less public in nature and more a topic of debate in the historical community, particularly 
for Catholic historians. As such, refutations of the anti-Catholic historical arguments were now 
issued by Catholic scholars rather than newspapermen. A third possibility was the rise of the 
second Ku Klux Klan. While strongly anti-Catholic, the Klan was also of Southern origin. While 
attacks against Catholicism certainly would draw their attention, the argument that the Pope was 
a close supporter of the Confederacy would be counterproductive as it would elevate Catholicism 
for a Southern audience. In the end, the topic drifted from popular discussions, likely as a result 
of a combination of some or all of the above-mentioned reasons. While anti-Catholicism existed 
significantly in the United States for decades after, including the arguments that continued that 
challenge the capability of Catholics to serve as the President of the United States, the argument 
that Pope Pius IX recognized the Confederacy ceased to be among the arguments used against 
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American Catholic. Only rarely in anti-Catholic books written after 1910 or in the occasional 
anniversary article did the topic of the Pope’s alleged recognition surface again.157 
Postwar discussions of the war and even most wartime newspaper articles were 
constrained. They failed to see the Pope’s letter in the full context of the connection between the 
American Civil War and the Italian Unification. Throughout the Civil War, that war and the 
Italian Unification served mostly to complicate diplomatic relations among all parties. The 
revolutionaries of the Risorgimento proved desirable recruits for the Union’s armies, although 
only those already in America actually fought. The North alienated the Papal States; the Pope’s 
personal sympathies lay with the South. Pius IX, however, remained true to his concern with a 
secular domain. Papal mediation of the American Civil War was more valuable to the Pontiff 
than an elevated Confederacy, even despite his personal sympathies. Even he, the longest-
reigning Pope in recorded history failed to retain Rome by 1870. The Confederacy achieved 
from the Papacy the closest thing to recognition that it had achieved from any nation: the 
possibility that a statement could at least be misinterpreted to mean recognition. Armed with the 
argument that the Pope did recognize their sovereignty, the Confederacy actively sought to 
dissuade Catholics from enlisting in the Union military and met with some success. That success, 
however, was too minor to be effective and the argument failed to convince any Catholic nation 
to recognize or aid the Confederate States of America. During the war, Pius’s letter led to a bitter 
debate in the press as to its meaning, a debate that extended into the postwar period largely as a 
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weapon to attack Catholicism. While it outlived most debate about Civil War foreign policy, 
because it was part of a larger debate over the presence of Catholicism in the United States, it too 
eventually faded from the popular mind. 
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